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List of abbreviations 
AG – Advocate General 
Charter – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
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Regulation – Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty 
TEU – Treaty on the European Union 
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Union or formerly Court of Justice of the European Communities 
Fundamental Freedoms 




 This thesis tries to tackle the issue of procedural justice in the area of EU 
competition law. The enforcement of competition rules in the Union on one hand fights 
the inefficiency on the markets caused by cartel agreements and abuses of dominant 
positions, but subjects the wrongdoers to unprecedented and sometimes indeed extreme 
fines on the other. There is in principle nothing strange about punishments for 
wrongdoings but the necessary prerequisite is to create certain level of guarantees 
within the legal system that will hinder any potential abuse of power by the enforcement 
authorities. 
 In the EU, it is common ground that every person – legal or natural – facing a 
civil claim or a criminal charge has a whole list of procedural rights which are 
guaranteed by the public authorities. This is true even more in the time when the Union 
adopted its own Charter of Fundamental Rights and has a legal obligation to access to 
the Convention which would make also the whole case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights binding upon the Union institutions. The core of these rights can be 
found in article 6 of the ECHR and articles 47-49 of the Charter. 
 However, in the field of competition law partly due to the technical and economic 
nature of the subject-matter partly due to the institutional setting some of these rights 
might seem to be endangered. Namely, given the extremely dominant position of the 
European Commission which acts in this field as the rule maker (enacts the delegated 
regulations in which it codifies its own practices, competences and the rights of the 
subjects), the investigator (investigates the individual infringements) and the „judge” 
since it issues enforceable decisions in individual cases. Yet, this is not a completely 
unique system in Europe and many of the national competition authorities also possess 
extensive powers. 
 The topic of fair trial in EU competition law includes many different aspects. 
Usually they are divided into three main groups – pre-trial rights, trial or hearing rights 
and post-trial or appeal rights. Sometimes, when it is referred to fair trial in competition 
law it includes all these aspects. However, there is also a narrower definition of the 
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topic which reflects only the third group of rights – the appeal rights. This narrower 
definition of the topic touches namely upon the issue of judicial review of the decision 
issued by the Commission performed by the judiciary of the EU, in particular by the 
Tribunal. 
 The author being aware of the understanding and scope of the right to fair trial in 
EU competition law uses the term in its narrower understanding. Therefore, in this 
thesis it will be dealt with the topic of judicial review, its depth, how it is exercised by 
the judiciary of the EU and how that approach changed in time. Due regard will be paid 
also to the case law of the ECtHR and to its influence in the EU. 
1.1 Research question 
 This thesis submits that (i) the (triune) role of the Commission in the process of 
enforcement of EU competition law is not decisive from the perspective of post-trial 
rights and (ii) with the possibility of full judicial review the system of EU competition 
law enforcement does not constitute any threat to the protection of fundamental rights. 
That shows that the difficulty in the system lies with the Court. Although the CJEU 
reviewed the procedural aspects of competition decisions taken by the Commission as 
well as all parts of the decision on sanction, in its longstanding case law it established 
the doctrine of marginal review under which it did not fully review the substantive parts 
of the decisions on the infringement as such. This constitutes the core of the problem. 
The right to be heard by an independent and impartial judge would be in this manner 
indeed marginalised to a mere technicality and would not fit the substantive standards 
required by the Convention and the Charter. The question therefore is: does the Court 
exercise only a marginal review in competition cases and if so, does that render the 
system of judicial review non-compliant with art. 47 of the Charter and art. 6 of the 
ECHR? 
1.2 Hypothesis 
 Competition law is one of the most important policies in the EU which is 
“founded on the values of respect for [...] the rule of law and respect for human rights” 
and also now with the Charter applicable it would be a logically incoherent system if it 
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allowed for factual lowering of the standards guaranteed even on the national level. The 
author will therefore submit that the system of EU competition law enforcement is 
compatible with the mentioned human rights guarantees as far as the Union courts 
provide private parties with the current level of scrutiny which is also required by the 
Charter and the Convention. 
 The thesis will, firstly, introduce the system of procedural guarantees of fair trial 
in the EU and then their role in the competition policy of the Union. Secondly, it will 
describe and analyse the role of the central authority in the field - the Commission. 
Thirdly and mainly it will examine the main concepts in the field such as the legal basis 
of the action for annulment, marginal and full review, it will analyse the developments 
of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court 
for Human Rights and show the relatively recent changes in the approach of the CJEU 
which responded to sever and not only academic criticism. Finally, the thesis will make 
a conclusion regarding the question asked at the beginning - whether the right to fair 
trial of individuals in competition cases is protected sufficiently. 
 The idea is to sum up the topic of protection of fair trial in the area of 
competition law, put it in the context of the case law of the CJEU as it developed in the 
time, confront it with the legal requirements stemming from the ECHR and find out 
whether the Union is indeed a community founded on values such as the rule of law and 
respect for fundamental rights. 
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2 The protection of fundamental rights in the EU 
 The original focus of the European integration project was security in Europe, 
economic cooperation and the recovery of a destroyed continent. A brief look into the 
history of the process of integration one can see already from the names of the 
respective treaties that centre of gravity lied for decades with the trade in key industrial 
resources, establishment of a common market, customs union, etc. The question of the 
protection of fundamental rights was in such an environment not an issue and was 
neither debated nor regulated on this level. 
 However, this had changed under the influence of the European judiciary. In the 
year 1969 the Court very briefly stated in the Stauder case that „fundamental human 
rights” are a part of the general principles of the EU and such are protected by the ECJ.
1
 
But given the prominence and extent of human rights protection in European states 
(namely in Germany) it was doubted that the Court will be able and willing to secure 
the high national standard of protection. It elaborated on that topic in 1970 in the case 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.
2
 It is true that the Court stated again that „respect 
for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected 
by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community“.
3
  
 However, the Court set out another (and perhaps more important) principle when 
saying that „the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State 
cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as 
formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional 
structure“.
4
 In other words, the Court expanded the principle of primacy of EU law to 
the extent that it was to take precedence over national constitutional law (including 
fundamental rights) as well. Implicitly that meant that EU law as interpreted by the 
                                                 
 
1
 Judgement of the ECJ in the case 26/69 Stauder [1969] ECLI:EU:C:1969:57, para. 7. 
2
 Judgement of the ECJ in the case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] 
ECLI:EU:C:1970:114. 
3
 Ibid., para. 4. 
4
 Ibid., para. 3. 
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Court may prevail over the national human rights safeguards as understood by 
respective constitutional courts. It is not hard to imagine that this might have been an 
indeed unpleasant prospect for many national constitutional judges. Even more so, 
when, at that time, there was no explicit human rights catalogue on the EU level. To 
certain extent these concerns were justified already by the ruling in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft itself. The Court did not agree with the German administrative 
court that the EU measure in question was in breach of the German constitution and 
upheld it. For some that was a sign that the level of protection of fundamental rights on 
EU level is not as high as on national level. 
 One could therefore not be surprised when in the year 1974 the German 
constitutional court issued its famous judgement Solange I. In it the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht reserved the right to review all acts of the Union, as long as 
the level of protection of fundamental rights in the Union will be lower than the level 
guaranteed by the German constitution.
5
 However, that would constitute a fundamental 
problem for a legal order which saw itself as autonomous and self-referential.
6
 The only 
institution authorised to review the legality of the acts of the Union and give a binding 
interpretation on EU law is the CJEU.
7
  
 The Court of Justice reacted to the Solange case already the same year with its 
decision in Nold. The Court stated that when protecting the fundamental rights, it has to 
observe the constitutional traditions common to the member states and therefore cannot 
uphold a measure which would be in conflict with fundamental rights protected by the 
national human rights catalogues.
8
 Moreover, the Court also expressed its opinion that 
certain international treaties which were signed and ratified by the member states can 
also serve as a guidance in this field. Thanks to this decision the EU transformed from a 
                                                 
 
5
 The judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the case Solange I, 2 BvL 52/71, 271 ff. 
6
 Přibáň, J., 2009. The Self‐Referential European Polity, its Legal Context and Systemic Differentiation: 
Theoretical Reflections on the Emergence of the EU's Political and Legal Autopoiesis. European Law 
Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 442–461. 
7
 Art. 19 TEU, 267 TFEU, judgement in the case C-314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:452. 
8
 Judgement of the ECJ in the case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the 
European Communities [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, para 13. 
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2.1 Three pillars of fundamental rights protection in the EU 
 The protection of fundamental rights in Europe stands therefore on three main 
pillars. For the purpose of this thesis two of the instruments will be the relevant ones.  
 First of all, the EU legal order has its own Charter of fundamental rights which 
shall have the same legal force as the Treaties.
10
 One must read the rights stemming 
from the Charter in accordance with its art. 52. Paragraph three of the said article 
stipulates that where the specific right in the Charter corresponds with a right in the 
Convention, „the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the said Convention”. However, Union law may provide for a more extensive 
protection.  
 The Convention, being the second relevant instrument, is not only the text of the 
international treaty itself which is binding upon the Contracting Parties. It must be read 
in the light of all the case law of the ECtHR which is via art. 52(3) also binding when 
interpreting the relevant provisions of the Charter. The rights emanating from the 
Charter must also be interpreted „in harmony with” the traditions/general principles of 
EU law.
11
 In the opinion of the author, very illustrating here is the approach of the 
German constitutional court which developed the doctrine of Strahlwirkung of the 
human rights through the legal system, i.e. every single rule in a legal system as well as 
the system as a whole must be interpreted in conformity with the human rights 
catalogue.
12
 This is exactly the approach which is delineated in art. 52(4) of the Charter. 
Moreover, the EU is legally bound to accede to the Convention itself which makes all 
the questions raised in this thesis even more pressing.  
                                                 
 
9
 DE VRIES, S., BERNITZ, U., WEATHERILL, S., 2013. The Origin of Fundamental Rights Protection 
in Europe. DE VRIES, Sybe, BERNITZ, Ulf, WEATHERILL, Stephen (eds.): The Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in the European Union after Lisbon., p. 1. 
10
 Art. 6(1) of the TEU. 
11
 Art. 52(4) of the Charter. 
12
 The judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the case Lüth, 1 BvR 400/51, para. 198. 
12 
 Yet, the first attempt to negotiate an accession agreement was rejected by the ECJ 
mainly for reasons of constitutional structure of the Union.
13
 Once the Union will 
accede (and due to the formulation of art. 6(2) TEU it is rather a question of „when‟ 
than „if‟) the bodies and agencies of the Union will be bound as to the final 
interpretation of the Convention by the judgments of the ECtHR and therefore in their 
decision-making they will have to respect the scope of the rights stemming from the 
ECHR as interpreted by the Strasbourg court. 
 However, after the Court‟s Opinion 2/2013 it seems that the accession to the 
Convention will be rather a difficult political balancing exercise between the 
specificities of the EU legal order as a new legal order of international law and the 
requirement that even the bodies of the EU can be made accountable to another judicial 
institution which is external to the system of the Treaties. Nonetheless, the fact that the 
EU has not yet acceded to the Convention does not change anything substantial.
14
 
 At this stage, it must be also noted that there is a line of case law of the ECtHR 
according to which there is a rebuttable presumption of equivalent protection of 
fundamental rights in the EU and under the Convention. The ECtHR formulated this 
idea in the famous Bosphorus case where it was deciding on the effects of a restrictive 
measure of the Union towards a third-state national.
15
 The ECtHR decided on the basis 
of the fact that the protection of fundamental rights is embedded in the EU legal order in 
the form of general principles of EU law, with regard to the Convention having a 
special position in the case law of the Court and also knowing about the development of 
a EU‟s own charter of fundamental rights. The ECtHR considered also the procedural 
possibilities of the review of acts of the organs of the Union satisfactory and therefore it 
stated that „[i]n such circumstances, the Court finds that the protection of fundamental 
                                                 
 
13
 To that end see Opinion 2/2013 of the ECJ [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paras. 153-258. 
14
 The first explicit reference to the Convention made by the Court was in the year 1975 in the judgement 
of the ECJ in the case Rutili v Ministre de l’Interiori 36/75 [1975] ECLI:EU:C:1975:137. In the same 
year, France acceded to the Convention as the last member state of the Union. 
15
 Judgement of the ECtHR in the case Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim 
Şirketi v. Ireland, Application No. 45036/98. 
13 
rights by Community law can be considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, 
“equivalent” […] to that of the Convention system”.
16
 
2.2 Subject-matter of the right to fair trial 
 The right to fair trial specifically is enshrined in art. 47 of the Charter which 
stipulates in its second indent: “Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. 
Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented”. The 
Charter speaks of one effective judicial remedy for “everyone whose rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated”.
17
 
 In comparison, the Convention offers two different levels of protection. First 
paragraph of art. 6 of the Convention provides for a general norm which applies to 
judicial proceedings when determining civil rights or obligations or any criminal 
charges against a person. Such a person is “entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.“
18
 
However, the Convention provides also special guarantees for persons charged with a 
criminal offence in paragraphs two and three of art. 6 and in art. 7. These guarantees 
entail namely the presumption of innocence, right to be heard in a language which the 
person charged understands, right to defence, no punishment without law, etc. 
 The Charter stipulates the same norms in art. 48 and 49, nonetheless it seems to be 
a general conclusion that art. 47 of the Charter and art. 6 of the Convention are 
correspondent and that „in all respects other than their scope, the guarantees afforded by 
the ECHR apply in a similar way to the Union”.
19
 The different structure of art. 47 of 
the Charter only leaves it up to the relevant court to ensure that in the particular 
proceedings the remedy it is offering, is effective and the trial is fair, by which it must 
take into account all the specific circumstances of the case at hand. 
                                                 
 
16
 Ibid., para. 165.
 
17
 Art. 47(1) of the Charter. 
18
 Art 6(1) of the Convention 
19
 Peers, S., Hervey, T., Kenner, J., Ward, A. (Eds.), 2014. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 1197-1198. 
14 
 The obvious question, however, is the scope of the civil and criminal part of art. 6 
of the Convention. What does it mean „determination of civil rights‟ and how is a 
„criminal offence‟ established? The ECtHR tends to give the notions used in the 
Convention their autonomous meaning independent from the content they may have in 
the domestic legal orders of the Contracting Parties.
20
 In the context of criminal charges, 
ECtHR was in the position of using one standard of safeguards (art. 6) to national legal 
systems which know only criminal offences as well as to systems which know also a 
specific type of public offences which are not called nor considered criminal (namely 
the administrative offences). Therefore, the ECtHR developed a longstanding line of 
case law in which it had to define the scope and a general guideline on the application 
of the notion criminal charges. 
 For the ECtHR, the national categorisation of the respective offence is not 
determining but rather a starting point for its further considerations. It also takes into 
account the nature of the offence and gravity of the sanction which can be imposed 
upon the perpetrator.
21
 It is clear from the case law of the ECtHR that even an 
administrative proceeding which can result into a financial or other sanction could in 
principle fall under the criminal prong of art. 6 of the Convention.
22
 This line of case 




 This is valid also despite the fact that art. 23(5) of the Regulation explicitly 
stipulates that „decisions [on fines] shall not be of criminal nature”. From the 
perspective of the ECtHR the said norm is the „national‟ characterisation and as such it 
is not determining. The above-mentioned Engel criteria apply here in the same manner 
as in the context of any national law. The Court accepted moreover the case law of the 
                                                 
 
20
 White, R., Ovey, C., 2010. The European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford: OUP, p. 42 ff. 
21
 Judgement of the ECtHR in the case Engel and others v the Netherlands, Application No. 5100/71; 
5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72. 
22
 Judgement of the ECtHR in the case Öztürk v. Turkey, Application No. 22479/93. 
23
 Judgement of the ECtHR in the case Société Stenuit v. France, Application No. 11598/85. 
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ECtHR referred to above in Hülls where it was deciding on the applicability of the 
presumption of innocence in competition proceedings.
24
 
 Yet, there are still evident differences between classical criminal proceedings and 
administrative proceedings which can result into some form of punishment (although 
such punishment can be a severe one as it can be shown on the data of the EC).
25
 In the 
case law of the ECtHR the term hard core criminal proceedings describes such type of 
proceedings which lie indeed in the core of criminal law, are aimed at prosecuting the 
most serious offences, the possible sanction can amount to imprisonment, etc. In the 
German legal tradition, these would be the proceedings based on the criminal code and 
code of criminal procedure. All the other type of proceedings led by administrative 




 This differentiation is not a mere academic exercise. From the perspective of 
application of fair trial guarantees, in both cases there must exist a possibility of a 
judicial review of both law and facts of the case (i.e. full review) but in case of non-
hard core criminal proceedings, there can be an administrative body deciding about the 
sanction in the first instance if there is a follow-up possibility of full judicial review.
27
 
However, the requirement of a court exercising full review is in the end a condition sine 
qua non of the right to fair trial.
28
 From this perspective it is easy to see how it fits the 
application of competition law in the EU. 
                                                 
 
24
 Judgement of the ECJ in the case C-199/92 P Hülls v Commission [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:358, para 
150. 
25
 See the statistical data of the Commission accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf. 
26
 Judgement of the ECtHR in the case Jussila v. Finland, Application No. 73053/01. 
27
 Ibid., para. 43; see also e.g. Wouter, W., 2004. The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial 
Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis. 
World Competition, (2004) 27, pp. 202-224. 
28
 Geradin, D., Petit, N., 2010. Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law: A Quantitative and 
Qualitative Assessment. TILEC Law and Economics Discussion Paper, No. 2011-008, p. 15. 
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2.3 Fundamental rights and EU competition law 
 The role of competition law in the European legal order is central. The EU and its 
predecessors came into existence as entities uniting the nations of Europe on 
economical basis. The articles of the Treaties protecting free competition within the 
internal market existed since the very beginning and their wording changed only very 
little in time.
29
 There are multiple objectives which are pursued by these provisions and 
they were discussed in depth at different occasions but it is important to realise that 
even a field of law which from a national perspective is not of constitutional importance 
has a different position in EU law.
30
 
 This is to stress that protection of fundamental rights is even more important in 
the field where there has been a major intervention of public bodies, law and decision-
making into private relationships. Combined with the development of EU law in the 
field of protection of fundamental rights, rule of law and protection of values the Union 
is founded upon, there is no room left for doubt what interests are here at stake and 
should be protected.
31
 Since it is also clear that the standards as set out above are to be 
applied in the competition law context, the Commission and the courts of the EU which 
are endowed with the powers to enforce the competition law must uphold these 
standards in their decision-making. 
 The area of competition law is a fertile ground for litigations in which the 
argument of fundamental rights has been raised regularly. Given the fact that the 
Commission possesses strong investigatory powers the parties have often claimed that 
both their substantive and procedural fundamental rights were violated. In the early case 
of Hoechst, the issue at stake was whether an undertaking, a legal person, enjoys the 
right to private and family life within the meaning of art. 8 of the ECHR.
32
 In other 
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See art. 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, accessible at http://www.gleichstellung.uni-
freiburg.de/dokumente/treaty-of-rome. 
30
 To that end see e.g. Craig, P., De Búrca, G., 2015. EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford: OUP, 
pp. 959-1071. 
31
 The development from no fundamental rights protection through Solange I&II to a Charter and 
protection and promotion of values as a founding principle set out in the Treaties after Lisbon. 
32
 Judgement of the ECJ in the joint cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission of the European 
Communities [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:337. 
17 
words the applicants claimed that their business premises are protected equally as a 
private home. The Court stated unequivocally that a dawn raid in the business premises 
cannot be looked at through the lens of private and family life. According to the Court 
„The protective scope of [art. 8 ECHR] is concerned with the development of man's 
personal freedom and may not therefore be extended to business premises”. The Court 
also pointed out that there was no case law of the ECtHR on that subject and it had 
therefore no guidance for a different interpretation.
33
 However, the ECtHR later 
clarified on that topic that in some cases even business premises can be protected under 
art. 8 ECHR.
34
 The ECJ adjusted its case law much later in the case Roquette where it 
accepted that under certain circumstances also business premises can enjoy the same 
level of protection as a private home of a person.
35
 It is an illustrative example of the 
dynamic of the system of protection of fundamental rights in Europe where the ECtHR 
has been setting up particular standards and the Court always had to react to these 
developments.  
 The sometimes-diverging conclusions of the two courts can be explained by 
their different background. While the ECtHR was founded as a purely human rights 
court protecting the rights set out in the Convention, the ECJ was a judicial body of an 
economic community which, at the beginning, did not have the ambition to decide on 
human rights matters – it was rather an economic than human rights court.  
                                                 
 
33
 Ibid., para. 18. 
34
 Judgement of the ECtHR in the case Niemitz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, para 29. 
35
 Judgement of the ECJ in the case C-94/00 Roquette Frères v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la 
consommation et de la répression des fraudes [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:603. 
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3 Role of the European Commission in the structure  
of EU law enforcement 
 Although the EU presents itself as an entity of non-state nature
36
 it provides 
certain guarantees which are typical for liberal democratic states like the principle of 
division of powers. That means that there is a more or less clear line between the 
legislative branch, executive branch and judiciary and their roles within the system. The 
different roles of the executive and the judiciary in the EU are crucial from the point of 
view of the right to fair trial in competition law. 
 The institution endowed with the power to ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed, is the Court of Justice of the EU.
37
 That 
means that the Court has in fact monopoly on final and binding interpretation and 
determination of validity of EU law. The general approach of the Court is that 
individual rights guaranteed by EU law have to be protected effectively and in 
equivalent manner as the rights guaranteed by the national legal orders.
38
 It was already 
stated above that fundamental guarantee in EU legal order as laid down in art. 47 of the 
Charter is a guarantee of an effective judicial remedy. Therefore, it is up to the Court to 
review i.a. the decisions of the Commission when it acts as the enforcement authority in 
the field of competition law. In that regard, the Court is surely an independent and 
impartial tribunal within the meaning of the Charter.
39
 
 In contrast, although the Commission (more specifically the DG Competition) 
possesses also certain type of decision making powers and determines rights and 
obligations of persons in the field of competition law, it acts as an authority of 
                                                 
 
36
 Opinion 2/2013 of the ECJ [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 49. 
37
 Art. 19(1) of the TEU. 
38
 See e.g. judgement of the ECJ in the case C-93/12 ET Agrokonsulting-04-Velko Stoyanov v Izpalnitelen 
direktor na Darzhaven fond «Zemedelie» - Razplashtatelna agentsia [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:432 or 
judgement of the ECJ in the case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] 
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administrative nature and is an inherent part of the executive branch. Article 17 TEU 
entrusts the Commission i.a. with ensuring the application of the Treaties, and of 
measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them and it is also designated to 
oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.
40
 In connection with other tasks enshrined in art. 17 TEU the 
executive role of the Commission is clearly embedded in the fundamental structure of 
the EU. In the field of competition law, it is reiterated in articles 103 and 105 TFEU. It 
is the Commission who ensures the application of the competition law rules. The 
specific powers of the Commission are then laid down by the Regulation 1/2003 
adopted on the basis of what is now art. 103 TFEU. 
3.1 Commission as the Competition Authority 
 The role of the Commission today is to evaluate the factual situation on the 
market and its structure, the position of the respective undertakings and their real 
economic influence in a specific segment of the market, it specifies the relevant market 
for a particular proceeding, calculates the economic performance of the undertakings 
(namely their turnover and profit), calculates the impacts of certain actions on the 
market on the consumer, asses the barriers to entry on a market or a possible foreclosure 
of a market and conducts other highly specialised activities of economic and non-legal 
nature.  
 Besides, based on art. 103 TFEU the Commission proposes also to the Council 
draft regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in arts. 101 and 102 
TFEU, it can also adopt implementing regulations based on art. 105(3) TFEU and it also 
produces a series of soft law documents which all together create the normative 
framework in the field of competition law in the EU. A look in some of the soft law 
documents the Commission produces to increase the transparency of its actions, allows 
to see that the concepts the Commission uses require a high level of competence in the 
field of economics. Although these concepts are introduced in the legal language they 
are of non-legal nature. 
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 The Commission also makes certain political decisions. From the wording of Art. 
17 TEU it is clear that the Commission as a whole is a political body which „promotes 
the general interest of the Union and takes appropriate initiatives to that end”.
41
 In the 
field of competition law it makes policy choices like which sector of the economy it will 
oversee more closely (given the limited resources it has and number of complaints 
lodged with it in accordance with art. 7 of the Regulation) and therefore whether its 
actions will potentially have an effect directly on the consumer (e.g. the telecom 
market) or whether the impact on the consumer will be more indirect (e.g. a probe into 
the steel production market). Other type of such policy decisions is whether the 
Commission orders an interim measure which can significantly disturb the activities of 
the undertaking in question or even the relevant market as such.
42
 The Commission also 
decides whether it will rather impose a fine, in case it finds a violation of the rules or 
whether it will choose the possibility of commitments or whether it will grant the 
leniency programme in a particular case.
43
 If the Commission decides to impose a 
sanction it is within its discretionary powers whether it will be a fine or periodic penalty 
payments and when they are due.
44
 
 Co-creating the normative framework, prosecuting the perpetrators and imposing 
sanctions all done by a single institution puts the Commission in a very specific, triune 
position when it comes to safeguarding the right to fair trial.
45
 
 It is true however that the procedure in front of the Commission also went through 
significant developments. Today the Commission tries to effectively guarantee certain 
level of fair trial rights even in the investigation phase. Namely, the investigation is 
done by the employees of DG Competition whereas the role to assess and evaluate the 
evidence in an oral hearing is conferred upon a Hearing Officer which is an 
independently acting person with a direct mandate from the College of the 
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Commissioners who appoint them and whose powers and prerogatives are laid down by 
a specific legal basis.
46
 The Hearing Officer also safeguards the effective exercise of 
procedural rights laid down by the Regulation, Treaties or the Court and decides 
potential disputes between the parties regarding such rights or e.g. access to the file. The 
Hearing Officers then draft the final report which are submitted to the Commissioner for 
competition and responsible Director-General. Moreover, based on such report the final 
decision is not taken solely by the Commissioner but by the College of Commissioners 
pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. 
 However, from the perspective of the narrow understanding of the right to fair 
trial as defined at the beginning, it does not change the situation very much. All the 
safeguards, which are for sure unprecedented for an enforcement body of administrative 
nature, are still regulated within and by the executive branch of power. Therefore, it 
does not constitute the necessary standard of protection which can be secured only by a 
judicial review from an independent and impartial court or tribunal. 
 The administrative decisions have a direct and significant impact on the 
subjective rights of the undertaking(s), their owners, employees and other stakeholders. 
The problems of the decision-making process in the field of EU competition law are 
well described by Nicolas Petit from the Université de Liege who identifies following 
main groups - (i) serious interference with fundamental rights (namely right to property, 
right to choose an occupation or conduct business, protection of personal data and 
others), (ii) sophisticated normative standards (retreat from formal standards in favour 
of economic analysis which is particularly challenging), (iii) subject-matter complexity 
(e.g. the complex markets of technological products), (iv) high cost of errors, (v) 
evidentiary hurdles (e.g. heavy reliance on ex post circumstantial evidence) and finally 
also (vi) the lack of conceptual homogeneity in enforcing the rules.
47
 
 The role of the Commission as it was already suggested is very specific and 
although it did not stay deaf towards these objections, it can be in no way designated as 
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an independent court or tribunal with full jurisdiction. It is therefore absolutely 
necessary that the undertakings have a possibility to counter the decisions in a court of 
law if they perceive that their rights were violated by the Commission. This implies that 
the right to fair trial plays here a crucial role. The negative effect of this is however, 
Petit submits, that a detailed judicial scrutiny limits the margin of discretion of the 
Commission and hence can cause a „decisional ossification”.
48 The question of level of 
judicial review becomes than a policy choice itself and as such is answered by courts 
and not by a prima facie political body. This is however a broader problem of 
judicialisation of politics and politicisation of courts which is beyond the topic of this 
thesis and has been discussed on different occasions.
49
 
 The different standards of review are closely connected to either procedural or 
substantive definition of rule of law. In the procedural paradigm, the courts review 
whether legislative or executive procedures have been followed. In the substantive one, 
the courts are obliged to review the substance and content of the act and particularly 
whether fundamental rights guarantees have been observed. The disadvantage of the 
latter obviously being the lack of democratic legitimacy and the danger of a government 
of judges.
50
 President of the Court Lenaerts however shows in one of his papers how the 
Court has taken the „structuralist‟ approach in the past, which does not favour the 
requirement of substantive review.
51
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4 Judicial review in competition cases 
 The question of intensity of the judicial review seems today to be one of the key 
elements of the notion of effective judicial remedy.
52
 To find out whether the 
enforcement of EU competition law is in compliance with the right to effective judicial 
remedy or the right to fair trial as it was set out above, it is necessary to focus on the 
level of review performed by the CJEU. The key criterion is whether the review 
performed by the CJEU satisfies the requirements laid down by the ECtHR on full 
jurisdiction or whether it is rather a marginal or deferential review of the Commission 
decisions. 
 The legal basis for judicial review of competition cases is twofold. Commission 
decisions can be challenged on the basis of the general provision for actions for 
annulment (art. 263 TFEU) and also on the basis of art. 261 TFEU in conjunction with 
art. 31 of the Regulation which provides for another possible way. The difference 
between these two provisions is significant. 
 Review under art. 263 TFEU is a classical legality review which has its model in 
the French contrôle de légalité. Such degree of review allows the Court to comment on 
formal or technical aspects of the Commission decisions and on the manner how the 
Commission exercised its prerogatives as provided for by art. 263(2) TFEU (i.e. lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers).
53
 The 
general approach of the Court is indeed to substitute the decision on questions of law 
not on questions of fact. However, the Court often treats the terms such as worker, 
services, goods, capital or agreement as questions of law.
54
 
 It is necessary to note that „control of legality is conceptually distinct from, and 
more limited than, a full „appeal on the merits‟ where the appellate court has full 
jurisdiction to review the facts, the law and all aspects of the overall correctness of the 
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 However to differentiate the two types in practice is not an easy task since 
the border line is not always clear cut „a review of legality may well shade into a review 
which is virtually indistinguishable from an „appeal on merits‟”.
56
 
4.1 Grounds for review under art. 263 TFEU 
 As to the lack of competence, this requirement seems to be relatively clear. 
Based on the principle of conferral, whenever an EU institution is acting it has to be 
able to point to a legal basis which authorises its action.
57
 Yet, it must be said that the 
Court interpreted the powers of the Union broadly and purposively in order to achieve 
Treaty objectives and therefore a competence of a body of the Union does not have to 
be always necessarily expressly stated in the text of the Treaties.
58
 
 The second ground for review - the infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement - is for the Court to define and with regard to individualised decisions it 
seems to include many of the aspects of procedural due process.
59
 According to 
professor Craig the term essential procedural requirement includes namely the right to 
be heard, the right to consultation and participation and the duty to state reasons.
60
 If 
any of these elements are missing, the Court is not hesitant to annul the act which was 
the result of such faulty procedure.
61
 
 The term „infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their 
application‟ is the broadest of the grounds for review under art. 263 and served as the 
vehicle for the development of the principals of judicial review.
62
 While the 
infringement of the Treaty refers to all provisions of the Treaties as amended, the 
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meaning of „any rule of law relating to their application‟ remains somewhat blurry. The 
intent probably was that the decision-making should not only comply with primary law 
as phrased by the Treaties but also  with other regulations, directives, decisions and also 
with the rules developed in relation to their application by the Court.
63
 In any event, it 
allowed the Court to introduce many of the general principles of law into the EU legal 
order, which now function as a threshold for annulling an act of a body or institution of 
the EU.
64
 These general principles include i.a. proportionality, legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations, non-discrimination, transparency, etc.
65
 
 It can be argued that via general principles the otherwise procedural ground for 
review can be turned into a substantive one – namely with regard to the principle of 
proportionality.
66
 Professor De Búrca however points out in that context that „the way 
the proportionality principle is applied by the Court of Justice covers a spectrum 
ranging from very deferential approach, to quite a rigorous and searching examination 
of the justification for a measure which has been challenged”.
67
 It appears that the most 
deferential approach is taken by the Court in cases where the body of the Union 
exercises a broad discretion entailing „political, economic and social choices on its part, 
and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments.”
68
 In such cases the 
relevant threshold of i/legality of the measure is whether the measure is „manifestly 
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking 
to pursue”.
69
 Although it might seem that review of proportionality is question of facts 
instead of question of law and hence such a ground for review is rather a substantive 
one, the British American Tobacco case shows that even this might be only very limited 
review in practice not amounting to a substantive one. 
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 On the other hand, in cases where an individual (fundamental) right is being 
restricted the Court scrutinizes the proportionality of the measure more vigorously.
70
 In 
these cases the relevant standard of review rather seems to be whether the alleged 
disproportionality „impinges upon the very substance of the [fundamental] right”.
71
 
Such a standard would definitely allow the Court to go into questions of fact and 
perform a substantive review even under art. 263 TFEU. 
 Both BAT and Hauer were however judgements on legislative measures. The 
decisions of the Commission which are the main issue of this thesis are of executive 
nature and the Court took to them a different approach although they possess both 
characteristics mentioned above – the Commission exercises broad expert assessments 
on one hand but restricts individual rights on the other hand. It will be shown further 
that the Court did not use this case law and developed a distinctive line of 
argumentation which moreover underwent a significant development throughout the 
time. 
 Generally speaking, the general principles of EU law could serve the Court as a 
way to turn the procedural grounds of art. 263 TFEU into more substantive ones but it 
will be shown that the Court chose another way how to face the requirements of the 
right to fair trial. 
 Regarding the misuse of power, it can be said that the Court uses this ground of 
review to cover the adoption of a measure by an EU institution „with the exclusive or 
main purpose of achieving an end other than stated, or evading a procedure specifically 
prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case”.
72
 
 Article 263 TFEU provides for grounds of review which are typically procedural 
and are referred to as contrôle de légalité. They relate to the way how a measure was 
adopted rather than to its specific content. However, the Court interpreted them in a 
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rather broad way and created within these procedural grounds room for substantive 
considerations. Although it is not very systematic it could be useful to address some of 
the concerns raised in the context of review competition decisions of the Commission. 
4.2 Review under art. 261 TFEU and art. 31 of the Regulation 
 On the other hand, review exercised on the basis of art. 31 of the Regulation 
1/2003 is a full jurisdiction review (contentieux de pleine jurisdiction). The 
aforementioned article states that “The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction 
to review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty 
payment. It may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment 
imposed”.
73
 Judge of the ECtHR Pinto de Albaquerque puts in following terms: „Full 
judicial review is properly characterised by its exhaustiveness, as it can and must 
encompass all aspects, both factual and legal, of the liability imputed to the offender. 
Jurisdiction is not „full‟ unless it is exhaustive. The „full‟ nature of jurisdiction 
necessarily implies its exhaustiveness”.
74
 AG Sharpston described the term full 
jurisdiction in one of her later opinions „as including „the power to quash in all respects, 
on questions of fact and law, the decision of the body below‟. A judicial body charged 
with review „must in particular have jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and 
law relevant to the dispute before it.‟”.
75
 This makes the EU review system a hybrid one 




4.3 Mixed review 
 Regarding the decision on illegality of the practice in question, the Court uses 
the grounds for review provided for by art. 263 TFEU as it was suggested above. It will 
be shown in the next chapter that although the legislative text did not change much, the 
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approach of the Court changed significantly over time. However, the starting point and 
longstanding practice of the Court was a formal approach towards the review which was 
also suggested by the wording and origin of the said article and its predecessors. In such 
a situation, the decision was to be assessed only as to its formal aspects, substantive 
findings were not to be re-evaluated and the Court could not substitute the 
Commission‟s decision with its own. However, it will be argued that this is not entirely 
the case anymore. 
 It is a common ground among both academics and practitioners that with respect 
to the sanction the Court can and indeed does perform a full review.
77
 The Court can 
fully review the part of a Commission decision which sets the fine and if the Court 
deems appropriate it can substitute this part of the decision with its own as a way of 
remedy or sanction. Nonetheless, the decision about the sanction cannot be fully 
separated from the rest of the decision regarding the alleged breach of the articles of the 
Treaty as such and taking into account the complexity of the whole decision, it is 
virtually impossible to review fully only the part on the sanction. 
 If the standard of fair trial is to be met by the Court, the Tribunal must be able to 
exercise the full jurisdiction regarding the decision as a whole. Yet, the doctrine is of 
the opinion that the Court never doubted that its standards of review even under the 
action according to art. 263 TFEU fully satisfy the demands established by the ECtHR 
regarding the right to effective remedy.
78
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5 Development of the standard of review 
 The practice of the Court went of course through a long development. One of the 
first cases which is also mentioned in the literature is the Consten and Grundig case 
from 1966.
79
 This case belongs to the basics of EU competition law in the field of 
exclusive agreements and their abolishment. 
 The German company Grundig concluded an exclusive distribution agreement 
for the French market with a company called Consten and in practice this agreement 
was an illegal barrier on the free movement of goods as guaranteed by the Treaties 
because it impeded the re-exports of the respective goods from Germany to France and 
vice versa. The Commission found the agreement in conflict with the ban on cartel 
agreements and issued an appropriate decision. In court the companies contested a 
series of aspects of the decision. 
 Firstly, a formal and procedural aspect which consisted of the form of the 
decision and the procedure leading to issuing it, namely they alleged a breach of their 
right of access to the file by the Commission and secondly, substantive aspects such as 
the scope of the relevant Treaty provision in the field of distribution agreements, the 
scope of the exceptions from the prohibition of cartel agreements and the interpretation 
of certain terms such as effect on the trade between member states. 
 The legal evaluation of the alleged breaches committed by the Commission was 
following: (i) a lack of competence on the side of the Commission, (ii) infringement of 
an essential procedural requirement and (iii) infringement of the Treaties. This was also 
the limit for the review performed by the Court. 
 The Court did not pay any special attention in rejecting the procedural 
arguments. As to the substantive arguments of both parties the Court used a phrase 
which became a mantra of judicial review in competition law cases: „Furthermore, the 
exercise of the Commission's powers necessarily implies complex evaluations on 
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economic matters. A judicial review of these evaluations must take account of their 
nature by confining itself to an examination of the relevance of the facts and of the legal 
consequences which the Commission deduces therefrom. This review must in the first 
place be carried out in respect of the reasons given for the decisions which must set out 
the facts and considerations on which the said evaluations are based”.
80
 
 The Court has in this way defined a part of the Commission‟s decision 
consisting of economic considerations which are characteristic by a high level of 
complexity of facts and their evaluation. The review of this part of the decision is to be 
limited to a review of the relevance of the facts in question and the legal conclusions 
drawn from them. 
 In other words, the Court examined the mere relevance of the facts taken into 
consideration by the Commission, and whether these facts allowed the Commission to 
come to its conclusions. The Court decided in this case not to subject to a 
comprehensive analytical scrutiny such parts of the decision in which the Commission 
performs a complex assessment of economic matters. 
5.1 Original legislative framework 
 To see the whole picture of the state of judicial protection in the field of EU 
competition law at that time it is necessary to consider the Treaties which defined the 
competences of the Court and thus created the borders within which Court could 
operate. In the sixties when the case was decided by the at that time High Authority and 
subsequently by Court the Treaties were in force in the form as they were enacted in 
Paris in 1951 (ECSC Treaty) and in Rome in 1957 (EEC Treaty); the Merger Treaty 
was only on its way (1965). The relevant provisions on the protection of free 
competition on the common market together with the provisions on action for 
annulment of the decisions of the High Authority in this field were enacted in the EEC 
Treaty.
81
 Nonetheless, art. 33 of the ECSC Treaty included also a provision allowing to 
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bring an action against a decision of the High Authority taken within the scope of the 
Treaty. 
 The action could be based on following grounds: „lack of legal competence, 
substantial procedural violations, violation of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to 
its application, or abuse of power”.
82
 However, the aforementioned article includes also 
an explicit exclusion of a (judicial) review of the decision of the High Authority when it 
comes to „conclusions […] drawn from economic facts and circumstances, which 
formed the basis of such decisions or recommendations, except where the High 
Authority is alleged to have abused its powers or to have clearly misinterpreted the 
provisions of the Treaty or of a rule of law relating to its application”.
83
 Economic 
evaluations are to be reviewed therefore only to a very limited extent and the literature 
started to use for it the name marginal review.
84
 
 AG Nils Wahl is of the opinion that it was indeed art. 33 of the ECSC Treaty 
which served as an inspiration for the Court‟s reasoning.
85
 The action against the High 
Authority was brought on the basis of art. 173 EEC Treaty since the decision was taken 
within the scope of this treaty and not the ECSC Treaty and although the grounds for 
review are the same under both treaties the exclusion of review of economic evaluations 
is missing under the EEC Treaty. Moreover, the grounds of review seem to be rather of 
a procedural nature and according to Wahl, that was a window of opportunity for the 
Court which without an explicit ground in the Treaties formulated the mentioned 
paragraph and created a new legal standard.
86
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5.2 Development of the case law in the field of merger control 
 It follows from what has been said that there was a clear tension between the 
right to fair trial and the practice of the Court which excluded a certain part of factual 
and legal considerations of the Commission from the judicial review with the argument 
of complexity and specific expertise. This is the main discrepancy which lies at the very 
core of the problem. 
 The Court followed this case law until the end of the century. There are cases 
where there is seemingly a change in the judicial rhetoric bud the essence stays the 
same. For example in the case Remia there is a formulation where the Court on one 
hand states that „as a general rule [it] undertakes a comprehensive review of the 
question whether the conditions for the application of art. 85(1) are met” but on the 
other hand it limits the „appraisal of complex economic matters to whether relevant 
procedural rules have been complied with whether the statement of the reasons for the 
decision is adequate, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there 
has been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers”.
87
 This was a clear 
refusal to conduct a thorough comprehensive review of all points of the decision of the 
Commission. The action was afterwards dismissed, among others, on the ground that 
the Court did not find that „the Commission based its decision on incorrect findings of 
fact or committed a manifest error in its appraisal of the facts of the case as a whole”.
88
 
This results in a strange situation where the conditions of application of the respective 
article of the Treaties and its scope was to be reviewed fully as well as the decision on 
the sanction but as an exception from the rule a certain (substantial) part of 
considerations leading to the decision was to be reviewed only marginally.
89
 
5.2.1 Possible motivations for the change in the case law 
 One can ask why did not the Court change its approach for a long period of time 
and at the same time why did the critique of the Court‟s approach emerge in larger 
                                                 
 
87
 Judgement of the ECJ in the case C-42/84 Remia BV and others v Commission of the European 
Communities [1985] ECLI:EU:C:1985:327, para 34. 
88
 Ibid., para 36. 
89
 Lenaerts, K., Maselis, I., Gutman, K., 2014. EU Procedural Law, Oxford: OUP, p. 392. 
33 
amount only at the beginning of the new millennium. The author thinks that the 
explanation is twofold. 
 First argument is an administrative-economical one, which from the viewpoint 
of fundamental rights protection cannot withstand but can shed some light on the 
situation. It was only in the year 1988 when the Court of First Instance was established 
pursuant to the Single European Act.
90
 It was described as a kind of a branch of the 
Court of Justice which was endowed with the competence to adjudicate on the 
competition cases in the first instance together with other agenda mainly of very 
technical nature to relieve the burden on the ECJ.
91
 
 Until that time there was only one instance which was to solve all questions of 
validity and interpretation of all EU acts, decisions, etc., both the agenda of preliminary 
references and direct actions. Moreover, in the 80‟s there was a considerable growth in 
cases coming to the Court.
92
 Until the establishment of the CFI the Court might have 
been motivated to deal with the complex and technical competition cases in a rather 
expeditious manner with the argument of effective functioning of the institution and 
hence of the effective functioning of EU law as such. One way to achieve that, would be 
to entrust the Commission with a margin of discretion regarding which the Court would 
exercise only a deferential review. It is of course arguable to what extent such practice 
of the Court is justifiable by judicial efficiency namely when it can result in potential 
cases where fundamental rights of individuals are not protected to a sufficient degree 
which would be a failure of the basic function of the Court as an institution. 
 Second argument which explains to large extent the emergence of this debate at 
that time is that the Commission started imposing monetary sanctions of unprecedented 
amounts. Whereas in the 70‟s the sanctions were in millions of Accounting Units in the 
most serious cases (the former Regulation No. 17/62 (EEC) stipulated in its art. 15 that 
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the sanctions are to be imposed in the European Accounting Units)
93
, at the end of the 
80‟s the fines imposed were in the orders of millions or lower tens of millions EAU
94
 
and at the end of the 90‟s and at the beginning of the new century the amounts imposed 
were hundreds of millions of EUR and more.
95
 In the year 2003 the Commission stated 
publicly that only for hard core cartels from 2001 until 2003 it imposed fines in the sum 
of EUR 3.2 billions.
96
 This is not a futile exercise in statistics but to illustrate how the 
gravity of the sanction, which is perhaps the central element among the Engel criteria, 
changed dramatically over time. If with the beginning of the new millennium the 
sanctions started to reach the mentioned amounts they also started to be perceived as 
criminal in nature and the tendency to apply the ECtHR case law even in EU 
competition cases emerged. 
5.2.2 First shifts in the case law and the Tetra Laval formula 
 The shift in the case law of the Court in such a situation was rather a question of 
time and it is traceable originally to the field of merger control.  It must also be put 
forward that the case law from the area of merger control is relevant here since art. 16 of 
the merger regulation lays down the same rules for judicial review of the merger 
decisions made by the Commission as the Regulation.
97
 Yet, it is paradoxical that 
whereas the merger control regulation gives the Commission explicitly a margin of 
discretion in economic assessments which also necessarily means a certain limitation 
for the Court, the Regulation is not phrased in such a manner and the margin of 
discretion enjoyed by the Commission can be only more broadly inferred.
98
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 Marc Jaeger in his article Marginalisation of Marginal Review points out several 
cases from which, in his opinion, the change of the approach of the Court emerged.
99
 As 
a primary illustration he points the attention to the case Kali und Salz from the year 
1998. The Tribunal in its evaluations of the concentration of undertakings 
manufacturing and distributing potash stated on the general level that the Commission 
has a certain margin of discretion „with respect to assessments of economic nature” 
which has to be respected by the judiciary.
100
 Nonetheless, in the next paragraph the 
Court goes further when saying „[t]hat being so, it must be held that the Commission's 
analysis of the concentration and of its effects on the market in question is flawed in 
certain respects which affect the economic assessment of the concentration”.
101
 The 
Court continued then the critical assessment of the factual evidence submitted by the 
Commission and concludes that „that the Commission has not established to the 
necessary legal standard the existence of a causal link between K+S and SCPA's 




 It is the requirement of a specific substantive legal standard, which is to be met 
by the Commission, which seems to be a significant shift from a mere marginal review 
performed in the Remia case where the Court only examined whether the Commission 
based its decision on incorrect findings of fact or committed a manifest error in its 
appraisal. 
 However, there are also opinions that this change in the formulation in the case 
law was rather a specification of the burden of proof born by the Commission than an 
increase of the standard of review of the economic assessments.
103
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 This development in the case law on merger control culminated in the appellate 
decision in the case Tetra Laval in which the Court of Justice even broadened the 
formulation by saying „Whilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin 
of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Community 
Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission‟s interpretation of information of 
an economic nature. Not only must the Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether 
the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that 
evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to 
assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions 
drawn from it”.
104
 This standard has been fully accepted by the Tribunal and has been 
used ever since as the standard of review of Commission‟s decisions. 
 Moreover, in the case General Electric the Tribunal stated that „[a]lthough those 
principles apply to all appraisals of an economic nature, effective judicial review is all 
the more necessary when the Commission carries out a prospective analysis of 




 In practice, in the field of merger control the Tribunal reviews not only whether 
the arguments laid down by the Commission are consistent and sufficiently persuasive 
but also whether they truthfully reflect the factual situation, it reviews their credibility 
and authenticity, whether the factual findings are complete (that the Commission 
couldn‟t have found and submitted other relevant facts which might have an influence 
on the decision) and the Tribunal also evaluates whether the factual findings correspond 
to the evidence in the file. In the opinion of the author, performing such scrutiny the 
Tribunal performs in practice full review of the factual part of the Commission‟s 
decision. 
 In the situation where the Tribunal also adds to the aforementioned also a review 
of the legal qualification of all facts submitted in the case, it can be concluded that 
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without pointing out explicitly its former case law on review of economic and factual 
appraisals of the Commission, it changes de facto its approach on this matter and leans 
towards the full review. 
 The question is then, to what extent that might cause an imbalance in the 
division of powers between the Commission and the judiciary of the EU. The Court is 
faced with a constant balancing of two basic principles. On one hand, it reviews all the 
elements that led the Commission to a certain conclusion to make sure that fundamental 
rights of the individuals are protected and that the judicial control is not „theoretical or 
illusory but practical and effective”.
106
 On the other hand, the Court has to accept a 
certain margin of discretion enjoyed by the Commission which is conferred upon it by 
the legislator and which prevents the Court from substituting the economic appraisals of 
the Commission with the Court‟s.
107
 This is a challenge the judges will be faced with 
when deciding every single individual case. 
5.3 Unclear case law on cartels and abuse of dominance 
 Although this line of case law existed in the field of merger control, with respect 
to the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU the situation was in no way as clear. 
For instance in the case GlaxoSmithKline in 2006 the Tribunal fully refers to its Remia 
line of case law in one part of the decision and then performs a relatively 
comprehensive review of the economic appraisals of the Commission regarding the 
analysis of parallel trading and its impact on the internal market.
108
 Interestingly, the 
Court of Justice on appeal upheld the GSK judgement as to the depth of review although 
it stated on the general level that the Tribunal „correctly stated that, when dealing with 
an application for annulment of such a decision, it carries out a restricted review of its 
merits”.
109
 This shows that the approach of the Court was ambiguous if not confusing 
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and that the judges on one hand knew the limits of the legislative framework and its 
own case law but on the other they realised the unsatisfactory protection of the 
fundamental procedural guarantees. 
 An illustration of the approach of the Court when applying art 102 TFEU is the 
Microsoft case of 2007.
110
 The Commission was assessing to what extent and under 
what conditions an owner of intellectual property rights who is in a dominant position 
on the relevant market can be forced to licence such rights. To be able to make such an 
assessment the Commission had to define the relevant product market which is 
a consideration of economic nature and as such it was supposed to be reviewed only 
marginally. Nonetheless, the Tribunal without any explicit remark went against its own 
practice and subjected this question to a full review.
111
 It seems therefore that it is 
correct to conclude that at that time the approach of the Court to review of 
Commission‟s decisions in the field of articles 101 and 102 TFEU was at least hard to 
predict since there was a discrepancy between what the Court stated explicitly and what 
it did in certain cases but not in others. 
 Although the Court decides on a case-by-case basis it is a common ground that 
its legitimacy is at least partly based on the fact that cases with similar factual 
background are decided in similar ways. It is not necessarily a requirement of the result 
but rather of the process by which the Court arrives to its conclusions. Such system 
must therefore be based on the common law principle of stare decisis where the courts 
are either bound by their own preceding case law or they depart from it on the basis of 
distinguishing explicitly the present case from the previous one.
112
 
 Similarly one of the aspects of the fair trial - the right to a well-reasoned judicial 
decision - allows that „the exercise of justice is not arbitrary nontransparent and that the 
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judicial decision-making is controllable by the broader public”.
113
 It is the longstanding 
case law of the ECtHR that the right to fair trial is composed of multiple aspects which 
if breached cumulatively can amount to a violation of the right to fair trial as such.
114
 
Therefore, the approach of the Court taken in the cases mentioned above is to be 
criticised as a potential to disturb the protection of fair trial on another level. 
 Nonetheless the case law of the Court either hinted to a gradual shift from 
marginal review to a higher standard or it was only to be regarded as an incoherence or 
disharmony within the Court‟s interpretation of the law. Even from a broader 
perspective there was no apparent reason for a different approach to merger cases on 
one hand and 101&102 cases on the other. 
 Regarding the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, one of the first cases 
where a clear shift in the argumentation of the Court can be observed is the case of 
Amann & Söhne and Cousin Filterie.115 The Tribunal did grant the Commission a 
margin of discretion but it emphasised that such a margin can never be unlimited and 
repeated its Tetra Laval case law on accuracy and completeness of the facts submitted 
reliability of the evidence and consistency of the Commission‟s arguments.
116
 That 
showed at least that the Court was willing and ready to use its merger control case law 
in the area of application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
 The Tribunal took an interesting step perhaps in the right direction in the case 
Clearstream.
117
 It used the formulation that „in so far as the definition of the product 
market involves complex economic assessments on the part of the Commission, it is 
subject to only limited review by the Community judicature. However, this does not 
prevent the Community judicature from examining the Commission‟s assessment of 
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 The Court played a little word game here and instead of reviewing 
economic assessments which it did not do in the past, in the present case it reviewed the 
Commission‟s assessment of economic data. 
 The assessment economic data can be understood in a narrower fashion than 
economic assessments since these can include also the economic theory and 
assumptions based on which the Commission gathers and evaluates the data. It is 
probably mostly the assumptions and theories the Commission departs from that 
includes the biggest part of policy choices where the margin of discretion has its 
justification. Therefore, if the Court is to review the assessment of the economic data 
but does not evaluate the policy choices made by the Commission it might be a 
satisfying compromise which respects both the division of powers and protection of 
fundamental rights of the parties. 
 In Clearstream the Court took every single argument of the claimants, 
confronted them with the facts and findings submitted by the Commission and came to 
the relevant factual and legal conclusions.
119
 It is one of the cases where it seemed that 
the approach of the Court was shifting towards a deeper review. 
5.4 Impact of the Menarini case 
 A contribution, perhaps a decisive one, to the debate which could not be ignored 
was the Menarini judgement of 2011.
120
 Although the case as such did not bring 
anything entirely new or groundbreaking into the debate it is worth analysing it since it 
underscored the direct relevance of the ECHR in competition law cases. In Menarini the 
ECtHR put together all the pieces of the puzzle and reiterated its previously stated 
principles regarding the criminal nature of some administrative offences, the role of an 
administrative enforcement body and the scope of judicial review. 
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 An Italian company was fined EUR 6 million by the Italian competition authority 
for being a member of a cartel on medical diagnostic equipment. The company 
challenged the fine before the Italian administrative courts and appealed to the 
Consiglio di Stato but both unsuccessfully. Both judicial instances had under Italian law 
the possibility to perform a review of legality which meant that they did not review the 
factual findings and could not substitute the decision of the administrative authority.
121
 
The company therefore applied to the ECtHR with the argument that its case was never 
heard by a court with full jurisdiction and hence its right to fair trial guaranteed by art. 6 
of the Convention was breached. 
 In the judgement the ECtHR first confirmed that it was a case where art. 6 of the 
Convention was at stake and that indeed proceedings such as to one in the case at hand 
is of a criminal nature given the gravity and punitive purpose of the sanction.
122
 
Secondly, the ECtHR reiterated that an administrative authority which is itself not an 
independent and impartial tribunal can decide in such cases in the first instance and this 
fact taken in isolation is not incompatible with the Convention.
123
 Thirdly, the 
judgement confirmed that the possibility of an administrative penalty of criminal nature 
imposed by an administrative body is not contrary to art. 6 only under the condition that 
an independent and impartial tribunal exercising a full jurisdiction can review the 
decision at stake.
124
 That means that such judicial body must have the competence to 
substitute the decision of the lower body with its own on all points both of law and fact 




 Eventually, the majority of the Second Chamber was of the opinion that Italian 
administrative courts were able to consider all the questions of law and fact and 
determine whether the Italian competition authority used its discretionary power in an 
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 Furthermore, according to the ECtHR, the review of Italian 
courts was not limited to a simple control of legality. In the case at hand the Italian 
courts were able to review whether the choices of the authority were well founded and 
proportionate and they also could examine the technical evaluations.
127
 Further 
consideration for the ECtHR was also that the courts were able to assess the adequacy 
of the sanction and could replace it. According to the ECtHR, the Consiglio di Stato 
examined the logical coherence of the administrative decision on the sanction, its 
adequacy and proportionality and, in conjunction with all the above-mentioned 
considerations, the court in Strasbourg concluded that such system is compliant with the 
requirements of art. 6 ECHR.
128
 
5.4.1 Dissenting opinion in Menarini 
 The Menarini case was decided by a majority of 6 to 1 and the judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque presented a strong and persuasive dissenting opinion according to which 
„the Italian administrative courts did not exercise genuine „full jurisdiction‟”.
129
 
 In the opinion judge Pinto de Albuquerque writes that „[a]ccording to their own 
interpretation of Italian law as applicable prior to the entry into force of the new Code 
of Administrative Procedure, the administrative courts could not „exercise powers of 
substitution to the point of applying their own technical assessment of the facts in place 
of that of the administrative authority‟. This meant that the main core of the judgment 
was removed from the jurisdiction of the Italian administrative courts. The decision as 
to the attribution of liability fell in reality to the independent administrative authority 
and not to the administrative courts”.
130
 
 Interestingly, the Consglio di Stato recognised four different stages of the 
administrative decision-making process („(1)the „establishment of the facts‟, (2) „the 
„contextualisation‟ of the competition rule which, referring to „indeterminate legal 
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concepts‟ (such as the relevant market, abuse of a dominant position, restrictive 
agreements), call[ed] for precise individual determination of the ingredients of the 
imputed offence‟, (3) the assessment of the facts in the light of the previously 
contextualised parameter, and (4) the imposition of sanctions”) from which it could 
fully review only the first and fourth stage and towards the rest it had only very limited 
powers of review. Yet, it is the remaining two stages where the technical discretion of 
the administrative authority plays a decisive role.
131
 
 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque points to the fact that the Italian court itself stated 
that „with regard to the legal characterisation of the facts adopted by the [competition 
authority], the Administrative Court‟s review was exclusively confined to examining 
the lawfulness of the decision. […] with regard to the second and third stages of the 
logical procedure followed by the [competition authority], the judicial review is „weak‟ 
as the court‟s task is confined to verifying that the decision adopted is logical and 
technically coherent, without imposing its own disputable technical assessment in place 
of that of the [competition authority]. […] the effectiveness of the defence undoubtedly 
suffered as a result of the fact that the court was debarred from conducting an intrinsic 
review. […] the court may not substitute its own findings for those of the [competition 
authority] (for instance regarding the determination of the market); likewise, the court 
may apply only the rules identified by the [competition authority] and cannot replace 
them with others; it cannot alter the characteristics of the investigation or even, 
accordingly, alter the decision adopted. It may merely verify its lawfulness.”
132
 
 This shows that such a situation where an administrative court is able to perform 
full review with regard to how and what facts were established and how and what 
sanction was imposed but unable to fully review the subsumption of the facts under the 
respective norm of law, the specification of the legal concepts in the factual 
circumstances of a particular case and their application to the facts, is for the ECtHR 
compliant with art. 6 of the Convention. 
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5.4.2 Standard of review after Menarini 
 It cannot be ignored that the considerations of the majority seem to be at least 
lenient to the Italian system, compared to the previous case law of the ECtHR as 
described above. It seems that the majority did not follow consistently the requirements 
of art. 6 and the court‟s own case law. If the judges were to follow the strict requirement 
of full review, there would have been a clear requirement of review of the facts of the 
alleged infringement, review of the assessment of the substantive concepts such as the 
relevant market, agreement restricting competition and other purely factual elements 
which were exactly the two parts of the decision-making process excluded from the full 
review as described above. Needless to say that the competence to substitute the 
decision of the administrative authority was lacking entirely. Christopher Bellamy puts 
it in his article bluntly: „[Some] fundamental concepts […] were effectively outside the 




 As the requirements of the ECtHR are phrased in Menarini, they indeed resemble 
much more the former case law of the ECJ. The terminology of „well-founded and 
proportionate choices” and „logical coherence of the decision” reminds one much of the 
Tetra Laval formula of „factual accuracy, reliability and consistency” of the decision. 
That does not seem to be necessarily an increase of the standard of protection. Seen 
from the perspective of Menarini, the case law of the CJEU might not have been in 
breach of the Convention as it was argued by many academics and practising lawyers. 
5.4.3 Depth of review and principle of division of powers 
 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque touches upon one more important point. Claiming 
that assessments of an administrative authority must be fully reviewable by a court 
implies that such authority does not possess a certain amount of decision-making 
autonomy, i.e. the court can always „replace” the administrative decision with its own. 
Since the authority is a part of a different branch of power than the court, such approach 
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might be at odds with the principle of division of powers. He is of the opinion that 
„[a]ccording to [the principles of separation of powers and the principle of the 
lawfulness of penalties], the imposition of publicly enforceable penalties goes beyond 
the traditional remit of the administrative authorities and should be a matter for the 
courts. Were the verification of the factual circumstances surrounding the imposition of 
a publicly enforceable penalty to be left to an administrative body, without subsequently 




 It is true that once we accept that we are finding ourselves in the realm of criminal 
law, a more stringent set of procedural rules applies (e.g. the administrative acts are 
presumed to have legal effect although entailing legal faults or administrative judicial 
actions generally do not have a suspensive effect which does not apply for criminal 
proceedings). Yet, firstly, competition law does not fall within the hard core of criminal 
law as it was argued above and secondly, the (European) legislation explicitly confers a 
certain margin of discretion upon the administrative enforcement body and that cannot 
be simply ignored and overruled by a judicial decision. 
 As it was already mentioned above, the dichotomy of a procedural v. substantive 
review coincides with the distinction of procedural and substantive rule of law, of which 
the division of powers is of course an intrinsic part. Procedural rule of law can be then 
understood under what Judge Lenaerts describes the structuralist theory. That is „a 
theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to 
improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to 
render it more democratic”.
135
 The point of structuralism „lies in the fact that it does not 
require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of 
government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure 
within which those decisions must be adopted”.
136
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 That is exactly the objection which could be raised against the last argument of 
judge Pinto de Albuquerque. It is not necessarily the role of the courts to substitute the 
technical and factual appraisals of administrative bodies to the greatest detail 
(„exhaustively” as judge Pinto de Albuquerque puts it). Such appraisals can form a part 
of policy-making processes of the executive branch of power and as such they cannot be 
simply dismissed with one stroke of the judicial pen. 
 If the right to fair trial and the principle of division of powers are to be reconciled, 
the judiciary must be allowed to exercise a comprehensive review over all parts of the 
administrative decision including the sanction. However, with regard to the substitution 
of the factual assessments, the contextualisation of the norms and final subsumption it 
must proceed with great caution and rather hesitantly. 
 A partial conclusion from the Menarini case is that the ECtHR wanted to confirm 
its former case law on the criminal nature of competition law proceedings as well as the 
fact that an administrative body is not an independent court or tribunal but it can decide 
in such cases in the first instance provided that an effective possibility of full judicial 
review exists. The ECtHR however did not take another step and the case is rather 
conciliatory towards the system of competition law enforcement in Europe and in Italy 
in particular. The judges in Strasbourg seem not to have transposed the rhetoric of 
exhaustive judicial review into the case law of the ECtHR and are seemingly willing to 
accept many aspects of the contrôle de légalité from the national courts. 
 As a final remark to this case, an attentive reader of the judgement might have 
noticed the concurring opinion of judge Sajó.
137
 He agreed with the majority that art. 6 
ECHR was not violated but with respect to the matter of judicial review he fully agreed 
with Judge Pinto de Albuquerque. For him the deciding element was that although the 
Consiglio di Stato formally proclaimed that it enjoys only a weak jurisdiction, de facto it 
performed such an analysis which, in the opinion of judge Sajó, satisfied the 
requirements of art. 6 ECHR. This discrepancy between what the courts say and what 
they do in fact should be remembered for a later moment since it will be relevant in the 
context of the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU. 
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5.5 Advocates-General as the prophets of a more comprehensive 
review 
 An approach which would be perhaps more „ECHR-compliant” even pre-
Menarini was suggested by the Advocate Generals of the Court of Justice already in the 
year 2009. In the case Papierfabrik August Köhler AG Yves Bot expressed his opinion 
that exactly because of the quasi-criminal nature of the competition proceedings and 
with regard to art. 6 of the ECHR „the Community judicature must conduct a very 
detailed judicial review to ascertain whether the Commission has observed the 
procedural rights of the parties. In other words, I consider that it should draw all the 
necessary conclusions where the Commission, in exercising its prerogatives, fails to 
observe the fundamental rights afforded to undertakings […]”.
138
 AG Bot criticises here 
the Court for not exercising a sufficient level of review and suggests a more 
comprehensive approach. 
 Yet, the Court of Justice did not follow his opinion on this matter. In 2010 AG 
Bot opined again in a competition case on the same matter.
139
 Although he again 
refused to take up the rhetoric of „stricto sensu criminal matter” and opts rather for the 
term quasi-criminal proceedings, he comes to the conclusion that given the fact that 
„[t]he fines referred to in Article 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 are comparable in nature 
and size to criminal penalties and the Commission‟s role, given its investigatory, 
examination and decision-making functions, is primarily one typical of criminal 
proceedings against undertakings” and „the procedure is therefore covered by „criminal‟ 
within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and must therefore be subject to the guarantees 
provided for by the criminal justice component of that provision”.
140
 The competition 
law proceedings, in the opinion of AG Bot, given their aim to protect economic public 
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policy, the punitive and preventive effect of the financial sanctions and their amount, 
must be subject to guarantees provided for by the ECHR.
141
 Interestingly, the AG also 
points out the older case law of the Court in which it had no problem to apply a 




 Later a similar opinion was voiced by AG Eleanor Sharpston in the case KME in 
February 2011.
143
 AG Sharpston first points to the relevance of the ECHR, hence the 
ECtHR and especially to its Engel line of case law.
144
 In the light of the Engel criteria, 
she has only „little difficulty in concluding that the procedure […] falls under the 
„criminal head‟ of Article 6 ECHR”.
145
 For her the main arguments are that „[t]he 
prohibition and the possibility of imposing a fine are enshrined in primary and 
secondary legislation of general application; the offence involves engaging in conduct 
which is generally regarded as underhand, to the detriment of the public at large, a 
feature which it shares with criminal offences in general and which entails a clear 
stigma; a fine of up to 10% of annual turnover is undoubtedly severe, and may even put 
an undertaking out of business; and the intention is explicitly to punish and deter, with 
no element of compensation for damage”.146 In other words, the criminal-like nature of 
the offence and of the sanction is what matters to the Court of Justice when assessing 
what degree of review, it has to perform. 
 This is practically an adoption of the Engel criteria to the case law of the Court 
of Justice. Importantly, AG Sharpston makes also the distinction between the case at 
hand and the hard core criminal law within the meaning of Jusila case law and 
concludes therefore that „the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply with 
their full stringency. That implies, in particular, that it may be compatible with Article 
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6(1) ECHR for criminal penalties to be imposed, in the first instance, not by an 
„independent and impartial tribunal established by law‟ but by an administrative or non-
judicial body which does not itself comply with the requirements of that provision, 
provided that the decision of that body is subject to subsequent control by a judicial 
body that has full jurisdiction and does comply with those requirements”.
147
 
 This conclusion also has some relevant implications for the argument submitted 
by the claimant that the Commission has a triple role of investigator, prosecutor and 
decision-maker in competition law enforcement procedures. Taken into considerations 
the arguments presented above, from the perspective of post-trial rights the problem 
indeed does not lie in the nature of the Commission but whether the Tribunal exercised 
a full review as it is required by the ECtHR. 
 This was a first clear word on that matter by a member of the Court. Moreover, 
the judges themselves in this respect fully accepted the opinion submitted by AG 
Sharpston and the Court in its judgement simply repeated what the AG suggested. 
However, all this is said with the important caveat that case was focused on the issue of 
sufficient judicial control over the imposition of the fines. All these conclusions were 
therefore valid for art. 261 TFEU and even AG Sharpston herself was not ready to 
extend them any further.
148
 From that perspective, her opinion was rather unsurprising 
and perhaps conservative. 
 In 2013 AG Kokott opined in the case Schenker and the consideration that 
competition proceedings have „character similar to criminal law” is a starting point of 
her analysis.
149
 Although in Schenker the question was whether the principle nulla 
poena sine culpa applies in EU competition law, it shows that the Court takes today for 
granted that principles of criminal law must be guaranteed also in competition 
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proceedings. Further illustration of this claim could be the Toshiba case or OTIS with 
regard to the ne bis in idem principle.
150
 
5.6 Court’s reply to Menarini – the cases KME and Chalkor 
 The judgements in cases KME and Chalkor were to be understood as direct 
response to Menarini since they were published just three months after the decision of 
the ECtHR although the Court did not use any references to Menarini.
151
 As stated 
above the central issue in both KME and Chalkor was the review of fine and there was 
no appeal on the merits but still the Court used it as a vehicle to express its opinion 
beyond what was necessary to solve the dispute at hand - in order to address Menarini, 
one could argue. 
 Firstly, it stated that with respect to the review of the sanctions, the Treaty itself 
foresaw a full review.
152
 But there was never really any doubt that with regard to the 
sanction the Tribunal has the full jurisdiction. The question therefore was rather, 
whether the review was exercised effectively or whether the Tribunal relied on the 
discretion of the Commission. 
 The Court of Justice stated the following: „in order to determine the amount of a 
fine, it is necessary to take account of the duration of the infringements and of all the 
factors capable of affecting the assessment of their gravity, such as the conduct of each 
of the undertakings, the role played by each of them in the establishment of the 
concerted practices, the profit which they were able to derive from those practices, their 
size, the value of the goods concerned and the threat that infringements of that type pose 
to the European Community. The Court has also stated that objective factors such as the 
content and duration of the anti-competitive conduct, the number of incidents and their 
intensity, the extent of the market affected and the damage to the economic public order 
                                                 
 
150
 Judgement of the ECJ in the case C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation and Others v Úřad pro ochranu 
hospodářské soutěže [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:72 and judgement of the ECJ in the case C-199/11 
Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:684. 
151
 Judgement of the ECJ in the case C‑272/09 P KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy 
SpA v European Commission [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:810 and judgement of the ECJ in the case C-
386/10 Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v European Commission [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:815. 
152
 Judgement of the ECJ in the case C‑272/09 P KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy 
SpA v European Commission [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:810, para. 93. 
51 
must be taken into account. The analysis must also take into consideration the relative 
importance and market share of the undertakings responsible and also any repeated 
infringements”.
153
 This seems to satisfy the requirement of full review entirely, 
provided that the Tribunal can substitute the decision of the Commission. 
5.6.1 Obiter dictum in KME 
 Regarding the review of legality of the decision according to art. 263 TFEU 
(which was neither a plea submitted by the applicant nor an issue directly related to the 
case at hand and should therefore be regarded as a mere obiter dictum) the Court held 
that „whilst, in areas giving rise to complex economic assessments, the Commission has 
a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the 
Courts of the European Union must refrain from reviewing the Commission‟s 
interpretation of information of an economic nature. Not only must those Courts 
establish, among other things, whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, 
reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information 
which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and 
whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it”.
154
 
 Moreover, the Court rightly pointed out that it has to review the case on the 
basis of the pleas and evidence submitted by the applicant and „[i]n carrying out such a 
review, the Courts cannot use the Commission‟s margin of discretion – either as regards 
the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the criteria mentioned in 
the Guidelines or as regards the assessment of those factors – as a basis for dispensing 
with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts”.
155
  
 Saying that, the Court not only reaffirms the Tetra Laval case law also in the 
field of art. 101 TFEU but emphasises that even the margin of discretion the 
Commission enjoys must not work as a kind of a black box which is fed with some 
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economic data and produces a decision resulting into a severe fine and that it cannot 
justify a lowered standard of review. 
5.6.2 New standard of review of the Court – Tetra Laval+? 
 It seems that the key to solve the problem of degree of review performed by the 
CJEU lies in the interconnectedness of the decision on the violation of the respective 
competition rule and the decision on the sanction. That is at least the approach the Court 
seems to adopt to overarch the differences between articles 261 and 263 TFEU and to 
guarantee a fair trial within the meaning of art. 6 ECHR.  
 The Court constructs a type of review which is based on two different legal 
provisions which, in its opinion, supplement each other: „[t]he review of legality is 
supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction which the Courts of the European Union 
were afforded by Article 17 of Regulation No 17 and which is now recognised by 
Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, in accordance with Article 261 TFEU. That 
jurisdiction empowers the Courts, in addition to carrying out a mere review of the 
lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute their own appraisal for the Commission‟s and, 
consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed.”
156
 
 In other words, via reviewing the amount of the fine the Court looks, the 
argument goes, into the factual findings of the alleged infringement, legal qualification 
and conclusions drawn from it and decide. This was also the proposition of AG 
Sharpston in her opinion. The Court of Justice tries in KME to create a clear and 
indisputable connection and interdependence between the finding of an infringement 
and decision on the sanction. 
 It is no wonder that it concludes that „[t]he review provided for by the Treaties 
thus involves review by the Courts of the European Union of both the law and the facts, 
and means that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested 
decision and to alter the amount of a fine. The review of legality provided for under 
Article 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the amount 
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of the fine, provided for under Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, is not therefore 




 This clearly shows that when reviewing the decision on the sanction the Court 
also reviews all the circumstances which must have been and were indeed decisive for 
the Commission when it was adopting the decision on the infringement as such. The 
same line of reasoning appeared also in the case Chalkor. 
5.6.3 Formal v. substantive approach towards the review 
 It was mentioned above that the courts might come into situations where they 
verbally perform certain activity but in fact do a different one. This was the reason why 
judge Sajó voted with the majority in Menarini - the Consiglio di Stato expressed its 
deference towards the decision of the administrative body but then, according to Sajó, it 
engaged in a full review. Interestingly, in KME the Court of Justice observed that 
„although the General Court repeatedly referred to the „discretion‟, the „substantial 
margin of discretion‟ or the „wide discretion‟ of the Commission, including in 
paragraphs […] of the judgment under appeal, such references did not prevent the 
General Court from carrying out the full and unrestricted review, in law and in fact, 
required of it”.
158
 Is such approach compliant with the right to fair trial? In Menarini for 
judge Sajó it was perfectly sufficient. The rest of the majority did not even consider this 
to be an issue and they approved the practice of the Italian court without any comment 
on that topic. This might show that the European courts tend to take a substantive rather 
than formal approach towards the degree of review and use the abductive type of 
reasoning: if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, than it 
probably is a duck. Regardless how others are calling it. 
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Conclusion 
 The question of procedural guarantees of fair trial in EU competition law is an 
old question. With the Lisbon Treaty and the enactment of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU into the primary law one could ask whether the situation changed 
substantively towards more protection and higher human rights standards. This thesis 
tried to show that it is a complex issue and the answer does not lie with one single legal 
instrument, a particular human rights catalogue or one decision of a court. The question 
whether the right to fair trial is guaranteed in EU competition proceedings went through 
a gradual and complicated development. Yet, it must be said that the main actors were 
the European courts. 
 The European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights played certainly a catalysing role. The recognition of the ECHR 
in the EC and later EU legal order was growing with the pressure from the part of 
national constitutional courts and with the need for a coherent and self-referential legal 
order. Among those lines the European Court of Justice accepted gradually the case law 
of the ECtHR on the criminal nature of certain competition proceedings. The Court also 
admitted that the Commission does not constitute an impartial court or tribunal which 
would be suitable for deciding on sanctions of criminal nature by itself. The remedy of 
that contradiction of fact and legal requirements of the right to fair trial is to have a 
court with full review over the decision of the administrative body. 
 The problem lies of course in the definition of a full jurisdiction and its 
application in individual cases. The ECtHR defined over time a court with full 
jurisdiction as a court which has the competence to review all questions of fact and law 
and can uphold, quash or substitute the decision of the administrative body. The Court 
adopted a more cautious approach and formulated over time multiple requirements for 
the reviewing court which were arguably, from the perspective of the ECtHR, 
unsatisfactory. Some academics even argued that the system of enforcement of EU 
competition law has the shortcomings embedded deeply in its legislative DNA and must 
be completely rebuilt. 
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 However, the Menarini case showed that the ECtHR might not be as strict in 
concrete cases as previously thought. Although the Italian courts themselves submitted 
that they were allowed to perform rather a control of legality than a full appeal on 
merits, the ECtHR was satisfied with the level of review they performed. Doing so, it 
might have reformulated its previous standard of full review to a less stringent one - 
review of factual findings as to their accuracy, proportionality and logical coherence 
and review of all aspects of the fine. It seems also that with regard to the former it is 
enough, according to the ECtHR, when the reviewing court has only the competence to 
quash the decision on the alleged infringement itself if it can substitute fully the 
decision on fine. In the opinion of the author, the ECtHR showed in Menarini that it is 
willing to close an eye a little in that respect. There is also another hint of a less strict 
approach in the concurring opinion of judge Sajó, in which it is suggested that it is more 
important the degree of review performed de facto in the particular case than a verbal 
approach of the reviewing court. 
 The Court of Justice responded to this with its judgements in KME and Chalkor. 
It fully accepted the premises of the ECtHR but it had to respect the boundaries of the 
legislative framework of EU competition law and judicial review. 
 Articles 263 and 261 TFEU simply presuppose a different type of review with 
respect to different parts of the decision and the Court cannot ignore that fact. Whereas 
the review of the fine under art. 261 TFEU is clearly ECHR compliant, art. 263 TFEU 
was seen as too narrow and not suitable for the needs of full review. Therefore, the 
Court had to make quite a long step to adjudicate that even under art. 263 the Tribunal 
must assess much more than the mere lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to 
their application, or misuse of powers. 
 This requirement goes in the same direction as the ECtHR‟s one and the author 
would argue that, after Menarini, the Court went even further. The Court makes it clear 
that it wants to use the interconnectedness of a decision in competition matters and 
basically through the full review provided for by art. 261 TFEU make an examination of 
the facts leading to the finding of an infringement and hence to the fine, which goes 
beyond what is provided for by art. 263 TFEU. Again, with regard to what was 
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suggested by judge Sajó and implicitly by the majority of the ECtHR in Menarini, such 
approach might be all right from the perspective of this thesis. 
 The author therefore submits that the system of judicial review in the field of 
competition law in the EU is currently compliant with the requirements of the right to 
fair trial as guaranteed by the Charter, Convention and the case law of the ECtHR. 
 However, this is in no way a desirable method and position for the Court. 
Namely it is highly at odds with the basic predictability of judicial decision-making, 
transparency of the judiciary and the rule of law (which should not mean rule of 
judges). Christopher Bellamy suggests in his article a possible way how to remedy the 
situation. In his opinion it would be most desirable if art. 261 TFEU and art. 31 of the 
Regulation were amended to read: 
New art. 261 TFEU - „Regulations … may give the Court of Justice unlimited 
jurisdiction with regard to all aspects of the decisions imposing the penalties provided 
for in such regulations”. 
New art. 31 of the Regulation - „The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction 
to review all facts and matters in decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or 
periodic penalty payment. It may reformulate the decision or cancel, reduce or increase 
the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed”.
159
 
This is for sure a desirable proposal but it must be born in mind that the procedure of 
the amendment of the Treaties is politically extremely sensitive especially in today‟s 
Europe and it is very hard to imagine that i.a. the lengthy process of approval by all 
member states would be undergone for such an issue which could be regarded as 
marginal, unimportant and unworthy the struggle by political leaders. The idea should 
be however remembered for the next round of revision of the Treaties. 
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Abstract in Czech 
I. Základní práva v EU a právo na spravedlivý proces 
 Evropská unie je společenství států zaloţené na společných hodnotách, mezi které 
patří mimo jiné hodnota právního státu (ve smyslu rule of law) a úcta k lidským právům.
1
 
Tyto hodnoty musí být reflektovány ve všech oblastech, ve kterých má Unie pravomoc ve 
smyslu doktríny prozařování vyvinuté zejména německým spolkovým ústavním soudem.  
 Unie má také svou lidskoprávní chartu - Listinu základních práv EU - která sama ve 
svém čl. 51 stanovuje, ţe vţdy, kdyţ orgány Unie nebo členských států aplikují unijní právo, 
musí dbát standardů ochrany v Listině zakotvených.
2
 Listina v zásadě inkorporuje zdroje 
základních práv, které v EU platily před jejím přijetím do primárního práva v roce 2009. 
Mezi těmito instrumenty měla určující postavení Úmluva o ochraně lidských práv a 
základních svobod a s tím související judikatura ESLP. Vztah k Úmluvě je velmi těsný, 
protoţe rozsah a smysl těch práv, které odpovídají právům zakotveným v Úmluvě má být 
dokonce stejný, pokud Unie neposkytne standard vyšší.
3
 Rozsah práv obsaţených v Úmluvě 
je pak samozřejmě určován rozhodovací praxí ESLP. Touto cestou se tak judikatura ESLP 
nepřímo stává pramenem unijního práva a příslušná práva obsaţená v Listině by měla být 
čtena ve smyslu rozhodovací praxe štrasburského soudu.  
 Toto je také případ práva na spravedlivý proces (tedy čl. 47 Listiny), které odpovídá 
čl. 6 Úmluvy. Samotné slovo “odpovídá” je pochopitelně vágní pojem a bylo by zajímavé, 
kdyby k němu vznikla příslušná judikatura. Konstrukce tohoto práva v Listině a Úmluvě se 
totiţ liší, a zatímco Úmluva rozlišuje explicitně proces, ve kterém se jedná o “občanských 
právech nebo závazcích” a proces projednávající “trestní obvinění”
4
, Listina naproti tomu 
hovoří o “právu na účinné prostředky nápravy před soudem”
5
 a to bez rozlišení, zda se jedná 
o civilněprávní, trestněprávní či jinou oblast, čímţ spíše připomíná čl. 13 Úmluvy. V dalších 
odstavcích však Listina vyjmenovává (a jedná se nejspíše o výčet taxativní) konkrétní 
záruky, kterými má být účinný prostředek nápravy zajištěn. I přes tyto spíše formulační 
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rozdíly lze však pravděpodobně uzavřít, ţe články 47 Listiny a 6 Úmluvy si navzájem 
odpovídají, a tedy ţe i judikatura ESLP k čl. 6 (potaţmo 13) Úmluvy je určující pro rozsah 
čl. 47 Listiny. Toto jsou základní premisy, které jsou směrodatné pro následující analýzu 
lidskoprávních záruk v kontextu vymáhání soutěţního práva EU. 
II. Role Komise jako odborného orgánu při vymáhání čl. 101 a 102 
 Orgánem ustanoveným k vymáhání soutěţněprávních pravidel v EU je Evropská 
komise resp. Generální ředitelství pro hospodářskou soutěţ.
6 
Komise tedy posuzuje strukturu 
trhu, postavení jednotlivých soutěţitelů na něm, posuzuje jejich reálný ekonomický vliv v 
daném segmentu trhu, vymezuje relevantní trh pro jednotlivá řízení, vypočítává 
ekonomickou výkonost soutěţitelů, počítá dopady určitých jednání na spotřebitele, odhaduje 
prostupnost trţních struktur pro různé soutěţitele, posuzuje bariéry vstupu na určitý trh a 
dělá celou řadu dalších vysoce specializovaných činností v ekonomické oblasti. Při pohledu 
do některých soft law dokumentů, které Komise vydává pro větší transparentnost svého 
rozhodování, je patrné, ţe koncepty, se kterými pracuje a které uplatňuje vůči soutěţitelům 
vyţadují vysokou míru odbornosti v oblasti ekonomie, a přestoţe jsou tyto koncepty 
zavedeny právním jazykem, jedná se o činnost jasně neprávní povahy.  
 Krom ekonomických posudků pak Komise rovněţ provádí do určité míry politická 
rozhodnutí. Z čl. 17 SEU je patrné, ţe Evropská komise jako celek je politickým orgánem, 
který “podporuje obecný zájem Unie a k tomuto účelu činí vhodné podněty”.
7
 V oblasti 
ochrany hospodářské soutěţe se politická rozhodnutí (ve smyslu policy choices) projevují 
například v tom, ţe s omezenými zdroji dá preferenci ve stíhání potenciálně protiprávních 
jednání buď v sektoru internetových sluţeb (sektor, který má velký dopad přímo na 
spotřebitele) nebo v sektoru infrastrukturních staveb (sektor, který má potenciál více 
zasáhnout například státní plány na rozvoj dopravy na určitém území). Specifičtějším 
druhem takovýchto rozhodnutí pak je například to, jestli se Komise rozhodne spíš ukládat 
pokuty, zda případně příjme závazky od příslušných “hříšníků”, nebo jakým způsobem 
uděluje výhody plynoucí z leniency programu. Pakliţe se rozhodne uloţit pokutu, je v rámci 
diskreční pravomoci Komise, jakým způsobem rozhodne o způsobu jejího placení - jak 
vysoké budou např. splátky a do jakého časového období budou rozloţeny. Takováto 
rozhodnutí plynoucí ze správního řízení se tedy dotýkají naprosto zásadním způsobem 
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 Čl. 105 Smlouvy o fungování EU. 
7
 Čl. 17 odst. 1 Smlouvy o EU. 
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subjektivních práv a zájmů samotného soutěţitele, majitelů, ale i zaměstnanců a dalších 
zúčastněných osob.  
 Problémy rozhodování v oblasti soutěţního práva velmi dobře popisuje jeden z 
předních evropských odborníků v této oblasti Nicolas Petit z Université de Liege a rozděluje 
je do několika okruhů - zásah do základních práv jako právo vlastnit majetek, právo 
podnikat, právo na ochranu osobních údajů a další, sofistikované normativní standardy, 
velmi komplexní předmět rozhodování, vysoká cena chyb v hodnocení,  specifické překáţky 
v procesu dokazování a nakonec i nedostatek dlouhodobé koncepční homogenity při 
vymáhání soutěţního práva.
8
 Proto je nesmírně důleţité, aby soutěţitelé měli moţnost 
napadnout příslušná rozhodnutí pořadem práva, domnívají-li se, ţe Komise při své činnosti 
pochybila. Právo na spravedlivý proces zde proto evidentně sehrává klíčovou roli. Stinnou 
stránku však představuje argument, ţe podrobný přezkum limituje prostor pro uváţení 
Komise, čímţ můţe rozhodovací praxe “kostnatět”.
9
 
III. Právo na spravedlivý proces v kontextu soutěžního práva 
 Rozhodování Komise v případě porušení čl. 101 a 102 SFEU bychom u nás nazvali 
správním trestáním. ESLP trvale judikuje, ţe pojmy Úmluvy musí být vykládány v 
autonomním významu a nemohou být zaměňovány za třeba i jazykově stejné pojmy v 
národních právních řádech.
10
 V rámci autonomní interpretace pojmu “trestní obvinění” pro 
ESLP není určující označení předmětného národního řízení či sankce v daném právním řádu 
(toto je pouze “výchozí bod” pro posouzení ESLP). Do úvahy ESLP bere krom (i) domácí 
klasifikace také (ii) povahu spáchaného skutku a (iii) závaţnost sankce, které daná osoba 
čelí.
11
 Z judikatury ESLP vyplývá, ţe i řízení před správními orgány, jejichţ výsledkem je 
finanční nebo jiná sankce můţe principiálně spadat pod trestněprávní část čl. 6 Úmluvy.
12
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 Geradin, D., Petit, N.: Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law: A Quantitative and Qualitative 
Assessment. Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) Law and Economics Discussion Paper, č. 008/2011 
a Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, č. 01/2011, str. 9-10. 
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 Stíţnost č. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5270/72 Engel a ostatní v. Nizozemí [1976], bod 81. 
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 Ibid., bod 82 
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 Viz např. případy stíţností č. 8544/79 Özturk v. Německo [1984] nebo přímo v oblasti práva hospodářské 
soutěţe stíţnost č. 11598/85 Societe Stenuit v. Francie [1992]. 
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Nelze však nevidět rozdíly mezi klasickým trestním řízením a řízením před správním 
orgánem, v jehoţ pravomoci je uloţení určité (třeba i velmi vysoké
13
) sankce.  
 Z tohoto důvodu ESLP odlišuje v rámci trestních řízení ještě tzv. hard core trestní 
řízení, kterými jsou myšlena klasická trestní řízení, coţ by v českém právním řádu 
odpovídalo řízení na základě trestního zákoníku a trestního řádu a poté ta řízení, ve kterých 
je uloţena veřejnoprávní sankce, ale nejedná se o striktně trestní věci.
14
 Praktický rozdíl 
mezi těmito dvěma typy řízení z pohledu standardů garantovaných čl. 6 Úmluvy je zejména 
ten, ţe přestoţe v obou případech musí rozhodovat soud s plnou jurisdikcí, u jiných neţ hard 
core řízení existuje moţnost, aby o uloţení snakce v prvním stupni rozhodoval správní 
orgán a soud s plnou jurisdikcí taková rozhodnutí přezkoumával.
15
 Poţadavek na soud s 




IV. Soudní ochrana práva na spravedlivý proces 
 Jak jiţ bylo řečeno, vymáhání soutěţněprávních pravidel EU probíhá formou 
správního řízení, které vede Komise, přičemţ finální rozhodnutí Komise lze napadnout 
ţalobou na neplatnost podle čl. 263 resp. čl. 261 SFEU ve spojení s čl. 31 Nařízení Rady 
(ES) č. 1/2003 o provádění pravidel stanovených v článcích 81 a 82 Smlouvy. Role Komise 
v oblasti soutěţního práva je poněkud specifická a rozhodně ji nelze označit za nezávislý 
soud s plnou jurisdikcí.  
 Na základě Nařízení má komise rozsáhlé vyšetřovací pravomoci a jiţ zmíněnou 
moţnost ukládání pokut. Krom toho však Komise na základě čl. 103 SFEU předkládá 
legislativní návrh na implimentaci zásad uvedených v čl. 101 a 102 SFEU a je tak součástí 
legislativního procesu, můţe vydávat implementující nařízení ve smyslu čl. 105 SFEU a v 
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neposlední řadě vydáváním soft law dokumentů vytváří normativní prostředí v oblasti 
hospodářské soutěţe v EU.  
 Pro odpověď na otázku, zda vymáhání soutěţního práva v EU je v souladu s právem 
na spravedlivý proces, jak bylo popsáno, se je třeba zaměřit na úroveň přezkumu 
prováděného Soudním dvorem EU.
17
 Klíčovým poţadavkem pak je, zda prováděná úroveň 
přezkumu naplňuje představu ESLP o plné jurisdikci nebo zda se jedná spíše o přezkum 
legality rozhodnutí Komise (v anglických textech se můţeme setkat s různou terminologií - 
na jedné straně stojí full review/jurisdiction a na druhé pak marginal/deferential review, 
kterýţto pojem povaţuji za přesnější neţ “přezkum legality”). 
 Plná jurisdikce, jak je chápána ESLP, znamená, ţe soud “disponuje pravomocí 
rozhodnutí vydané niţší instancí zrušit v kterémkoliv bodě, v otázkách práva i faktů. Musí 
mimo jiné mít pravomoc přezkoumat všechny otázky práva i faktů relevantních v 
předmětném sporu”.
18
 Jak jiţ bylo řečeno, Tribunál přezkoumává soutěţně-právní 
rozhodnutí Komise na základě obecného ustanovení SFEU o ţalobě na neplatnost. Přezkum 
sankce má zvláštní právní základ v čl. 31 Nařízení a tento umoţňuje neomezený přezkum 
rozhodnutí, kterým Komise stanoví pokutu nebo penále. Pokuta nebo penále tak můţe být 
Tribunálem zrušena, sníţena nebo zvýšena.
19
 Co se tedy týče rozhodnutí o uloţení pokuty 
nebo penále, panuje mezi praktiky soutěţního práva i akademiky v zásadě shoda, ţe 
vzhledem k tomuto výroku Tribunál disponuje plnou jurisdikcí.
20
 Nicméně vzhledem k 
tomu, ţe pro výrok o pokutě či penále je potřeba výroku o porušení čl. 101 či 102 SFEU, a 
tedy vzhledem ke komplexnosti rozhodnutí je nemoţné, aby úplnému přezkumu podléhala 
pouze jeho jedna (navíc druhou přímo podmíněná) část. Tedy pakliţe má být právu na 
spravedlivý proces učiněno zadost, musí Tribunál disponovat a vykonávat plnou jurisdikci s 
ohledem na celé rozhodnutí Komise. 
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 Podle čl. 19 Smlouvy o EU je Soudní dvůr EU tvořen Soudním dvorem, Tribunálem a specializovanými 
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18
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V. Soutěžněprávní proces lucemburským pohledem 
 Praxe SDEU pochopitelně procházela vývojem. Jedním z prvních případů, ze kterého 
je zjevně patrná míra přezkumu tehdejším ESD, je případ 58/64 Consten a Grundig z roku 
1966. Německá společnost Grundig uzavřela výhradní distribuční smlouvu pro území 
Francie s firmou Consten a tato dohoda tak fakticky bránila volnému pohybu zboţí, jelikoţ 
neumoţňovala reexport předmětného zboţí z Německa do Francie ani naopak. Komise 
shledala předmětnou dohodu v rozporu se zákazem kartelových dohod a vydala příslušné 
rozhodnutí. Při soudní obraně proti rozhodnutí Komise strany napadaly celou řadu 
argumentů. Právní kvalifikace porušení jejich práv je však v zásadě trojí - překročení 
pravomocí Komise, porušení základních procedurálních poţadavků a porušení Smluv. Tím 
byla také nastavena meze přezkumu vykonávána ESD. Soud k substantivní argumentaci 
stran (týkající se porušení smluv) přikročil formulací, která se od té doby stala mantrou 
přezkumu souteţních rozhodnutí Komise: “Furthermore, the exercise of the Commission's 
powers necessarily implies complex evaluations on economic matters. A judicial review of 
these evaluations must take account of their nature by confining itself to an examination of 
the relevance of the facts and of the legal consequences which the Commission deduces 
therefrom. This review must in the first place be carried out in respect of the reasons given 




 Tedy ESD vymezil v rozhdonutí Komise určitou oblast ekonomických úvah, které jsou 
charakteristické vysokou mírou komplexity faktů a jejich hodnocení. Přezkum těchto úvah 
Komise má být omezena na přezkum relevance faktů a právních důsledků z toho 
vyvozených. Jinými slovy soudní přezkum sledoval, zda fakta, která Komise hodnotila, byla 
relevantní a zda tato fakta umoţňují vyvodit příslušné právní závěry. ESD v tomto případě 
rozhodl, ţe rozhodnutí Komise v oblasti komplexních hodnocení ekonomických otázek 
nebude podrobovat zevrubnému analytickému přezkumu.  
 Stav soudní ochrany v předmětné oblasti však byl závislý na tehdejším znění Smluv. V 
době, kdy Soud rozhodoval o případu Consten a Grundig byly stále ještě v účinnosti 
zakládající Smlouvy ve znění Římských smluv - tedy konkrétně Smlouva o zaloţení 
Evropského společenství uhlí a oceli a Smlouva o zaloţení Evropského ekonomického 
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společenství. Ustanovení o ochraně hospodářské soutěţe stejně jako ţaloba na neplatnost 
aktů Komise v této oblasti byla upravena čl. 173 Smlouvy o EES. Nicméně čl. 33 Smlouvy o 
ESUO obsahuje rovněţ ustanovení o moţnosti napadnout rozhodnutí Vysoké autority (staré 
pojmenování Komise v oblasti dohledu nad trhem s uhlím a ocelí podle Smlouvy o ESUO), 
který vymezoval tyto důvody neplatnosti: “nedostatek pravomoci, porušení podstatných 
pravidel řízení, porušení Smlouvy nebo kteréhokoli jiného právního pravidla, které se týká 
jejího provádění”.
22
 Článek 33 Smlouvy o ESUO však obsahuje také explicitní vyloučení 
soudního přezkumu rozhodnutí Vysoké autority v případě, ţe se jedná o “hodnocení situace 
vyplývající z hospodářských skutečností anebo okolností, vzhledem k nimţ byla zmíněná 
rozhodnutí nebo doporučení učiněna, ledaţe se proti Komisi namítá, ţe se dopustila zneuţití 
moci anebo ţe zřejmým způsobem zanedbala ustanovení smlouvy nebo jakékoli jiné právní 
pravidlo, které se týká jejího provádění”.
23
  
 Dnešní generální advokát Nils Wahl se domnívá, ţe právě ustanovení čl. 33 Smlouvy 
o ESUO mohlo být inspirací pro výše uvedenou úvahu Soudu.
24
 Ač tedy v čl. 173 Smlouvy 
o ESS chybí vyloučení hodnocení situací vyplývajících z hospodářských skutečností, 
důvody přezkumu legality rozhodnutí Komise rovněţ vymezuje jako nedostatek příslušnosti, 
porušení podstatných formálních náleţitostí, porušení této smlouvy nebo jakéhokoli 
právního předpisu týkajícího se jejího provádění anebo pro zneuţití pravomoci. Toto jsou 
důvody, které by se mohly zdát jako převáţně procesního rázu, čehoţ Soud patrně vyuţil a 
bez explicitní opory ve Smlouvách zavedl onu výše zmíněnou formulaci poskytující Komisi 
prostor pro uváţení při hodnocení některých ekonomických otázek. 
 Z uvedeného vyplývá pnutí mezi právem na spravedlivý proces ve formě poţadavku 
na tribunál s plnou jurisdikcí, jak vyţaduje EÚLP a praxe, kdy ESD nepřezkoumává určitou 
část faktických a právních úvah v rozhodnutí Komise s odkazem na jejich komplexitu a 
specifickou odbornost. Právě toto je diskrepance, která je jádrem celého problému.  
 Soudní dvůr EU navíc v principu svůj přístup nezměnil aţ do přelomu tisíciletí. Na 
některých kauzách je sice patrná určitá změna rétoriky, ale podstata věci zůstala stejná. 
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 Wahl, N.: Standard of Review – Comprehensive or Limited? In: Ehlermann,C., Marquis, M. (eds.): 
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Například v kauze Remia se objevuje formulace kterou Soud na jedné straně říká, ţe 
principem je úplný přezkum toho, zda jsou splněny podmínky pro aplikaci soutěţněprávních 
pravidel, na druhé straně však dle názoru Soudu přezkum ekonomických hodnocení a úvah 
Komise musí být limitován na to, zda byla dodrţena relevantní procesní pravidla, zda 
odůvodnění je adekvátní, zda fakta byla přesně popsána a zda-li se Komise nedopustila 
zjevného pochybení v uváţení či zneuţití pravomoci.
25
  
 Ţaloba v tomto případě pak byla skutečně zamítnuta mimo jiné z toho důvodu, ţe 
Soud neshledal, ţe by “Komise rozhodla na základě nesprávného posouzení faktů či práva 
nebo ţe by se dopustila zjevného pochybení v hodnocení faktů případu jako celku”.
26
 
Důsledkem tedy byla situace, kdy otázka působnosti příslušného soutěţního článku Smlouvy 
a podmínky jeho aplikace principiálně podléhala plnému přezkumu stejně jako rozhodnutí o 
sankci, nicméně coby výjimka z pravidla určitá část úvah, o které se opíralo výsledné 
rozhodnutí Komise, byla přezkoumávána pouze marginálně.
27
  
VI. Marginalizace marginálního přezkumu 
 Posun v judikatuře však z určitých důvodů časem nastal a je vystopovatelný původně 
do oblasti kontroly spojování podniků. Marc Jaeger ve svém článku Marginalistaion of 
Marginal Review
28
 upozorňuje na řadu případů, ze kterých se podle jeho názoru začala 
odvíjet změna přístupu v judikatuře přičemţ jako první ilustrativní případ volí Kali und Salz 
z roku 1998.  
 Tribunál v hodnocení předmětné koncentrace podniků zabývající se výrobou a 
distribucí potaše uvádí k míře přezkumu rozhodnutí Komise v obecné rovině, ţe Komise 
disponuje určitým prostorem pro uváţení při posuzování ekonomických okolností a soudní 
moc musí tento prostor respektovat.
29
 Nicméně v následujícím odstavci Tribunál konstatuje, 
ţe “analýza Komise předmětného spojení a jeho účinků na trh je chybná v jistých ohledech, 
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které mají vliv na ekonomické hodnocení spojení”.
30
 Následuje kritika týkající se Komisí 
předloţených důkazů a závěr, ţe “Zjištění Komise se proto […] nezdají být podpořena 
dostatečně přesvědčivým a konzistentním souborem důkazů. […] Za těchto okolností se zdá, 
ţe Komise dostatečně neprokázala existenci příčinné souvislosti […]”.
31
 Právě poţadavek 
Tribunálu na předloţení dostatečně přesvědčivého a konzistentního souboru důkazů se zdá 
být poměrně významným posunem od kauzy Remia, kde Soud zkoumal, zda nedošlo k 
nesprávnému posouzení faktů či práva či zjevnému pochybení v hodnocení faktů. Objevily 
se však i názory, ţe tato změna v dikci soudu byla spíš upřesněním důkazního břemene 
Komise neţ zvyšování standardu přezkumu ekonomických aspektů rozhodnutí Komise.
32
  
 Vývoj judiaktury v oblasti kontroly spojování podniků vyvrcholil odvolacím 
rozsudkem v kauze Tetra Laval, ve kterém Soud formulaci z případu Kali und Salz rozšířil o 
vyjádření, ţe přestoţe “Soudní dvůr přiznává Komisi určité volné uváţení v hospodářské 
oblasti, neznamená to, ţe soud Společenství nesmí přezkoumávat výklad údajů  hospodářské 
povahy provedený Komisí. Soud Společenství totiţ musí zejména ověřit nejen věcnou 
správnost dovolávaných důkazních materiálů, jejich věrohodnost a jejich soudrţnost, ale 
rovněţ přezkoumat, zda tyto skutečnosti představují veškeré relevantní údaje, jeţ musí být 
při posuzování komplexní situace vzaty v úvahu, a zda o ně lze opřít vznesené závěry”.
33
 
Tento standard byl plně akceptován Tribunálem a je v současnosti pouţívaným standardem 
přezkumu rozhodnutí Komise.  
 V případě General Electric pak Tribunál dokonce stanovil, ţe “Komisi sice musí být 
přiznán určitý prostor pro volné uváţení pro účely uplatnění hmotněprávních pravidel 
nařízení č. 4064/89, neznamená to však, ţe soud Společenství nesmí přezkoumávat právní 
kvalifikaci údajů  hospodářské povahy provedenou Komisí“.
34
 V praxi tedy Tribunál v 
oblasti spojování podniků přezkoumává nejen dostatečnou přesvědčivost a konzistentnost 
důkazů, ale i věcnou správnost, věrohodnost, zda důkazy představují všechna relevantní 
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 Ibid., bod 225.  
31
 Ibid., bod 228; Daleko výstiţnější znění je však anglická formulace “that the Commission has not established 
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fakta - tedy zda Komise nemohla předloţit další fakta, která by v daném řízení mohla změnit 
obraz situace a Tribunál rovněţ hodnotí, zda faktické závěry, které stojí na předešlém jsou 
správné. Tím Tribunál dle názoru autora vyslovuje svou vůli k úplnému přezkumu faktické 
stránky rozhodnutí. Pakliţe k tomu Tribunál rovněţ přidává přezkum právní kvalifikace 
údajů hospodářské povahy (tedy všech zmíněných faktů), nelze neţ dojít k závěru, ţe tímto 
přístupem významně mění svůj původní náhled na přezkum rozhodnutí Komise, a aniţ by 
explicitně upozorňoval na změnu judikatury, de facto tak činí a přiklání se k úplnému 
přezkumu. 
 Přestoţe existovala tato linie případů v oblasti kontroly spojování podniků, v oblasti 
aplikace čl. 101 a 102 byla situace komplikovanější. Například v případě GlaxoSmithKline 
na jedné straně sice Tribunál explicitně odkazuje na judikaturu Remia v určitých aspektech 
rozhodnutí, na druhé straně však provádí poměrně podrobný přezkum ekonomických úvah 
Komise týkajících se analýzy paralelních prodejů a jejich dopad na vnitřní trh.
35
 Zajímavé 
je, ţe Soudní dvůr judikaturu GSK potvrdil, co do provedené míry přezkumu, avšak v 
obecné rovině se vyjádřil slovy, ţe Tribunál “[p]rávem uvedl, ţe kdyţ je mu předloţen návrh 
na zrušení takového rozhodnutí, provádí omezený přezkum, pokud jde o věc samou”.
36
  
 V případě aplikace čl. 102 je ilustrativní případ Microsoft z roku 2007.
37
 Komise v 
tomto případě posuzovala, za jakých podmínek můţe být dominantní podnik donucen 
licencovat některá svá práva k duševnímu vlastnictví. Aby toto mohla posoudit, musela 
vydefinovat relevantní produktový trh, coţ je odborné ekonomické posouzení, které by mělo 
podléhat pouze marginálnímu přezkumu. Nicméně aniţ by Tribunál deklaroval, ţe je z 
nějakého důvodu potřeba změnit judikaturu a tuto otázku podrobit detailnímu přezkumu, 
učinil tak bez dalšího.
38
 Zdá se tedy, ţe v dané době byl přístup Soudního dvora EU v oblasti 
aplikace čl. 101 a 102 SFEU poměrně špatně předvídatelný, protoţe existoval rozpor mezi 
tím, jaký byl explicitně vyjádřený standard přezkumu a do jaké míry Tribunál případy 
skutečně přezkoumával.  
                                                 
 
35
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 Paradoxem přitom je, ţe v oblasti kontroly spojování podniků, které probíhaly v 
reţimu nařízení Rady (EES) No 4064/89, které bylo novelizováno nařízením Rady (ES) No 
139/2004, existovalo explicitní ustanovení svěřující Komisi diskreční pravomoc v oblasti 
posuzování ekonomických okolností, coţ znamená i určité omezení přezkumu Soudem, jak 
bylo naznačeno výše. Naproti tomu na poli aplikace čl. 101 a 102 Nařízení 1/2003 takto 
formulováno není a diskreční pravomoc Komise je pouze obecněji dovoditelná.
39
 V tomto 
ohledu tak bylo moţné spatřovat buď jakýsi postupný přechod od marginálního přezkumu k 
vyššímu standardu nebo jednoduše vnitřní rozpornost nebo disharmonii v rámci soutěţně-
právní judikatury. Ani z širšího kontextu totiţ nevyplývá nějaký podstatný důvod pro 
rozdílný přístup Soudního dvora EU k rozhodnutím Komise v jednotlivých oblastech 
regulace hospodářské soutěţe. 
 Co se týče oblasti kartelového práva a zákazu zneuţití dominantního postavení, jeden 
z prvních případů, ve kterém je moţné pozorovat určitý posun v judikatuře Soudu, je Amann 
& Söhne and Cousin Filterie.
40
 Tribunál opět přiznal Komisi prostor pro uváţení, ale 
zdůraznil ţe takovýto prostor nemůţe nikdy být neomezený a pak zopakoval svou judikaturu 
ve věci Tetra Laval.
41
 Z toho bylo patrné přinejmenším to, ţe Tribunál je ochotný pouţít 
judikaturu z oblasti kontroly spojování podniků i v rámci aplikace článků 101 a 102. V 
případě Clearstream pouţil Tribunál formulaci, ţe přestoţe komplexní ekonomické úvahy 
Komise podléhají pouze marginálnímu přezkumu, Trubunál je i tak musí pokaţdé 
přezkoumávat.
42
 Následuje pak opět přezkoumání ekonomických úvah Komise v přibliţně 
třiceti odstavcích, ve kterých Tribunál přezkoumává kaţdý důvod ţalobců, konfrontuje ho s 




 Takovýto přístup se nezdá být ideálním řešením a cestu z něj se snaţili naznačit 
generální advokáti Soudního dvora jiţ od roku 2009. V případu Papierfabrik August Köhler 
GA Yves Bot vyjádřil své přesvědčení ţe právě z důvodu kvazi-trestního charakteru 
soutěţních řízení a s ohledem na výklad čl. 6 EÚLP “musí soud [Unie] provádět velmi 
                                                 
 
39
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40
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ECLI:EU:T:2010:165. 
41
 Ibid., bod 131. 
42
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43
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důkladný přezkum toho, zda Komise dodrţuje procesní práva účastníků”, přičemţ v 
marginálním přezkumu spatřuje újmu na účastníkově právu být slyšen.
44
 Soudní dvůr však 
stanovisko generálního advokáta v tomto bodě nenásledoval. Podruhé zazněl podobný hlas 
od GA Eleanor Sharpston v případu KME v únoru roku 2011.  
 Generální advokátka shrnuje trestní charakter soutěţněprávního řízení, poukazuje na 
to, ţe nepatří do tvrdého jádra trestního práva a ţe je tedy aplikovatelná výše citovaná 
judikatura ESLP umoţňující v prvním stupni rozhodovat správnímu orgánu, který sám není 
nezávislým soudním orgánem. Bez zajímavosti není, ţe na rozdíl od GA Bota odkazuje v 
těchto věcech nejen na standard ochrany zaručený EÚLP nýbrţ také na Listinu a ustanovení 
čl. 6 Úmluvy a čl. 47 Listiny tak jednoznačně v této věci dává naroveň. GA Sharpston také 
akceptuje nezbytnost úplného přezkumu v takovém rozsahu, jak jej vyţaduje ESLP. 
Nicméně podstatný aspektem tohoto konkrétního případu je fakt, ţe kasační opravný 
prostředek, respektive ţaloba na neplatnost rozhodnutí Komise směřovala proti výši pokuty. 
Pro generální advokátku tak bylo velmi jednoduché říct, ţe “není pochyb o tom, ţe 
pravomoc soudního přezkumu v plné jurisdikci přiznaná Tribunálu článkem 229 ES 




 Soudní dvůr v tomto případě v zásadě přesně opakuje stanovisko GA. Nejprve 
konstatuje, ţe co se týče přezkumu sankcí, byl Smlouvami zamýšlen přezkum v plné 
jurisdikci.
46
 Co se týče přezkumu legality rozhodnutí podle článku 263 SFEU, uvedl Soudní 
dvůr “ţe ačkoliv Komise má v oblastech, ve kterých se provádí komplexní hospodářské 
posouzení, určitý prostor pro uváţení, neznamená to, ţe unijní soud nesmí výklad 
hospodářských údajů provedený Komisí přezkoumávat. Unijní soud totiţ musí zejména 
ověřit nejen věcnou správnost dovolávaných důkazních materiálů, jejich věrohodnost 
a soudrţnost, ale musí rovněţ přezkoumat, zda tyto skutečnosti představují veškeré 
relevantní údaje, jeţ musí být při posuzování komplexní situace vzaty v úvahu, a zda lze 
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o ně opřít závěry, které z nich byly vyvozeny”.
47
 Tím potvrzuje judikaturu Tetra Laval i pro 
oblast čl. 101 SFEU a klade důraz na to, ţe prostor pro uváţení Komise nesmí fungovat jako 
black box, do kterého vejdou ekonomické údaje a vypadne z něj rozhodnutí, na základě 
kterého je udělena pokuta.  
VII. Důsledky judikatorního posunu 
 Právě provázanost rozhodnutí o protiprávním jednání a rozhodnutí o pokutě se zdá 
být klíčem k zodpovězení otázky, zda přezkum soutěţněprávních rozhodnutí Komise 
prováděný Tribunálem resp. Soudním dvorem EU jako celkem je v souladu s poţadavkem 
na soud s plnou jurisdikcí, jak je vyţadován ESLP. I podle názoru GA Sharpston pojem 
“plná jurisdikce” ve smyslu judikatury ESLP zahrnuje rovněţ prostředky ochrany proti 
rozhodnutí konstatující samotné protiprávní jednání.
48
 Tedy aby Tribunál byl povaţován za 
soud s plnou jurisdikcí ve smyslu ESLP, musí vykonávat plnou jurisdikci nad celým 
rozhodnutím Komise ve všech jeho bodech.  
 Vzhledem k tomu, jak byl přezkum rozhodnutí o pokutě a zbytku rozhodnutí popsán 
výše, snaţí se Soudní dvůr v rozsudku KME vytvořit dostatečné propojení, zdůraznit 
závislost výroku o sankci na zbytku rozhodnutí, kdyţ zdůrazňuje, “ţe pro stanovení výše 
pokut je třeba zohlednit dobu trvání protiprávních jednání a všechny skutečnosti, které 
mohou ovlivnit posouzení jejich závaţnosti, jako je jednání kaţdého z podniků, jejich role 
při zavádění jednání ve vzájemné shodě, zisk, který mohou z těchto jednání mít, jejich 
velikost a hodnota dotyčného zboţí, jakoţ i nebezpečí, které představují protiprávní jednání 
tohoto druhu pro Evropské společenství”.
49
 Soudní dvůr rovněţ uvedl, ţe musí být 
zohledněny objektivní skutečnosti, jako je obsah a doba trvání protisoutěţních jednání, 
jejich počet a intenzita, rozsah dotčeného trhu a zhoršení hospodářského veřejného pořádku. 
Analýza musí rovněţ zohlednit relativní význam a podíl odpovědných podniků na trhu, 
jakoţ i případné opakování protiprávního jednání”.
50
 Tento svůj názor vyjádřil Soudní dvůr 
rovněţ v ten samý den publikované kauze Chalkor.  
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 Toto faktické propojení či zdůraznění vzájemné závislosti obou částí rozhodnutí se 
zdá být jakýmsi “tunelem” či cestou, jak překonat právní nedostatek a objektivní rozdíl v 
konstrukci přezkumu rozhodnutí o porušení příslušné právní normy a rozhodnutí o udělení 
sankce a přezkoumávat tak v plné jurisdikci celé rozhodnutí Komise.  
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Abstract 
Thesis title: The Enforcement of EU Competition Law and Its Compliance with the Right to 
Fair Trial 
The EU is a community based on common values among which the prime role is played by 
fundamental rights. One of the most important rights which serves also as a vehicle for the 
protection of other rights is the right to fair trial. That is valid also for the specific field of 
EU competition law. The European Commission issues in competition proceedings 
sanctions which are of criminal nature. Such sanction must be either imposed or at least 
reviewed by an independent court or tribunal with a full jurisdiction. This is a doctrine 
developed by the ECtHR in Strasbourg under art. 6 of the Convention and it has been well 
established in its case law for decades. Since the Commission itself is not an independent 
court or tribunal, its decisions must be reviewed by the ECJ which must exercise the full 
jurisdiction over the decisions in question. In the past the ECJ was criticised that it did not 
possess or exercise the full jurisdiction by which it failed to safeguard the standard of fair 
trial. Although the ECJ accepted the line of case law on criminal nature of Commission‟s 
decisions, at times it was indeed rather hesitant to review fully the parts of the decision 
where the Commission assessed the factual circumstances and decided on the matter of 
existence of the infringement of relevant competition rules. This thesis shows the 
development of the case law from the very deferential approach of the ECJ in cases like 
Consten Grundig and Remia to more comprehensive review in recent years in the cases like 
KME or Chalkor. Although the ECJ never doubted that it fulfils the standards of art. 6 of the 
Convention and later art. 47 of the Charter, the analysis of the case law shows that the 
standard of review exercised by the ECJ did change in time substantially and the ECJ 
showed some creativity in interpreting the Treaties to create a path for the required full 
review of Commission‟s decisions in competition cases. 
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Abstrakt 
Název diplomové práce: Vymáhání soutěţního práva EU Evropskou Komisí a jeho soulad 
s právem na spravedlivý proces 
Evropská Unie je společenství zaloţené na společných hodnotách a úctě k základním 
právům. Jedním z nejdůleţitějších základních práv, které je zároveň nástrojem pro ochranu 
všech dalších práv, je právo na spravedlivý proces. To platí také v poměrně technické oblasti 
soutěţního práva EU. V soutěţněprávních řízeních ukládá Evropská Komise sankce, které 
jsou svou povahou trestního charakteru. Z toho plyne povinnost, ţe takováto sankce musí 
být uloţena nebo aspoň přezkoumána soudem disponujícím plnou jurisdikcí. To je doktrína 
vyvinutá Evropským soudem pro lidská práva v rámci čl. 6 Úmluvy, která je hluboce 
zakořeněná v judikatuře tohoto soudu jiţ po desetiletí. V minulosti byl SDEU kritizován za 
to, ţe plnou jurisdikcí nedisponoval nebo ji odmítal vykonávat a tím pádem byly narušovány 
standardy ochrany spravedlivého procesu. Ačkoliv ESD vzal zmiňovanou judikaturu ESLP 
za svou a akceptoval, ţe rozhodování Komise můţe mít trestněprávní charakter, často spíše 
odmítal provádět plný přezkum těch částí rozhodnutí Komise, ve kterých posuzovala 
faktické a odborné otázky a rozhodovala o tom, jestli samotná soutěţněprávní pravidla byla 
či nebyla porušena. Tato práce ukazuje vývoj judikatury od velmi formálního přezkumu jako 
například v kauzách Consten Grundig a Remia aţ po daleko zevrubnější substantivní 
přezkum v posledních letech v kauzách KME či Chalkor. Rozebrána jsou rovněţ klíčová 
rozhodnutí ESLP, která měla největší dopad do judikatury ESD. Přestoţe ESD nikdy 
nepochyboval, ţe splňuje z tohoto pohledu standardy čl. 6 Úmluvy a později čl. 47 Listiny 
EU, předloţená analýza judikatury ukazuje, ţe úroveň přezkumu prováděného ESD se 
v čase měnila výrazně a ESD také prokázal značnou míru kreativity při interpretaci 
ustanovení smluv, aby si vytvořil nástroj k potřebnému plnému přezkumu rozhodnutí 
Komise v soutěţněprávních případech. 
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